Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American Federalism by Kreimer, Seth F.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2002 
Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American 
Federalism 
Seth F. Kreimer 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Jurisprudence 
Commons, Legal Commons, Legal Theory Commons, and the State and Local Government Law 
Commons 
Repository Citation 
Kreimer, Seth F., "Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American Federalism" (2002). Faculty 
Scholarship at Penn Law. 1170. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1170 
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: 
Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
RESPONSE
LINES IN THE SAND: THE IMPORTANCE OF BORDERS
IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM
SETH F. KREIMERt
The highest praise to which a scholar can aspire is to have one's
work accepted in print as a vital insight. But being viewed as a worthy
enough participant in debate to be made the subject of careful pub-
lished criticism by a colleague comes a close second. Professor Rosen
offers this latter honor to the work I have done on the subject of ex-
traterritorial regulation. Generously characterizing me as a "promi-
nent scholar,"] Professor Rosen devotes a good portion of his thought-
ful and extensive article to the effort to demonstrate that my earlier
work erred in arguing that American constitutional federalism is in-
consistent with efforts by states to prosecute their citizens for actions
that are in fact legal in the sister states where the actions take place.
Professor Rosen and the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review have graciously offered me the opportunity to respond.
Rather than reproduce the arguments I have made in earlier arti-
cles in extenso,2 I will endeavor to highlight the most important ele-
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am indebted to Leo-
nardo Cuello for invaluable research assistance and to Ned Diver for important and
enlightening commentary on this paper. Responsibility for errors, omissions, or mis-
understandings, of course, remains mine alone.
I Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism,
150 U. PA. L. REv. 855, 933 (2002) [hereinafter Rosen, Extraterritoriality]. Professor
Rosen is also the author of The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance in Residential
Associations, Municipalities, and Indian Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REV. 1053
(1998) [hereinafter Rosen, Outer Limits].
2 Those who are interested in the evolution of my thinking on these and related
issues may consult Seth F. Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. Sci. 66 (2001) [hereinafter Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom]; Matthew D. Adler
& Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998
SUP. CT. REv. 71 [hereinafter Adler & Kreimer, The New Etiquette]; Seth F. Kreimer, Ter-
ritoriality and Moral Dissensus; Thoughts on Abortion, Slavery, Gay Marriage and Family Val-
ues, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 161 (1996); Seth F. Kreimer, "But Whoever Treasures Free-
dom... ": The Right to Travel and Extraterritorial Abortions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 907 (1993)
[hereinafter Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom]; Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and
Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Fed-
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ments of conflict between our approaches and to indicate the reasons
why I continue to maintain my original position. In the course of the
discussion, I will touch on Supreme Court developments since the
time that I engaged in my original research. This response begins
with an overview of the differences between Professor Rosen's percep-
tions of the nature of American federalism and my own, continues
with an analysis of the differences between our understandings of the
current caselaw, and concludes with an examination of the philo-
sophical issues between us.
I. THE NATURE OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM
A. Areas of Agreement
It is well to begin with areas where Professor Rosen and I find
agreement.
We agree, first of all, that American federalism does in fact leave
room for substantial variation of moral visions and legal regimes
among states, and that this is a strength of our system. When citizens
can choose among and compare the virtues of the permission of as-
sisted suicide in Oregon covenant marriage in Louisiana, medical
marijuana in California,5 and same-sex unions in Vermont,6 we are
likely to have a society that is morally richer, practically freer, and per-
sonally more fulfilling than if a single inflexible code governed the na-
tion. Second, we agree that citizens by constitutional right do, and
morally should, have the opportunity to leave the state polities of
which they find themselves members.7 Third, we agree that when citi-
eralism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451 (1992) [hereinafter Kreimer, Law of Choice].
3 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.805 (Supp. 1998).
4 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (West Supp. 2002).
5 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETYCODE § 11362.5 (West 2001).
6 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (Supp. 2001).
7 As a matter of positive law, Professor Rosen acknowledges that the heritage of
the Articles of Confederation, the Citizenship and Privileges and Immunities Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the caselaw of the Supreme Court establish a right
on the part of citizens of any state to leave that state, and to take up residence in any
other state. See Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 913-14 (discussing Saenz v. Roe,
526 U.S. 489 (1999)). Founded as it is on emigration from other countries, the United
States has long taken the position that the right to alter one's citizenship by expatria-
tion is an "inherent and fundamental right." JAMES H. KETrNER, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 1608-1870, at 268-70 (1978); see PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS
M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT 54-56 (1985) (noting a "robust right of ex-
patriation"). The clarification of citizenship in the aftermath of the Civil War brought
an explicit recognition by Congress in 1868 that "'the right of expatriation is a natural
[Vol. 150: 973
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zens leave their home states, those states rarely seek to enforce their
moral visions by criminally prosecuting their citizens' lawful activities
in other states.8 States often extend their reach to punish extraterrito-
rial actions that have tangible impacts on the territory over which they
are sovereign; a shot fired across the border from South Carolina into
Georgia is the classic justification for the exercise of Georgia's crimi-
nal authority. But an effort by Georgia to prosecute its citizens for
gambling in Nevada is aberrant. Our differences arise in large meas-
ure over whether this third fact is a regrettable artifact of misunder-
standing the nature of the state's real powers-as Professor Rosen ap-
pears to believe-or a legally compelled and normatively desirable
characteristic of American federalism, as I maintain.
B. History, Practice, and Structure: Territorial States
In common understanding, a state's law governs its own territory.
Most Americans, when they drive across the border from Pennsylvania
to New Jersey, assume that the relevant speed limit becomes New Jer-
sey's, not Pennsylvania's; if offered a seat at a blackjack table in Ne-
vada, they would believe that the question of its legality is governed by
Nevada law. And in most cases, they would be right, for, in general,
state criminal statutes are territorially limited. Indeed, in most states,
explicit provisions of their own constitutions preclude the states from
and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."' KETrNER, supra, at 344 (quoting Act of July 27,
1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223 (1868)); see SCHUCK& SMITH, supra, at 61-62 (describing the
enactment of the first Expatriation Act). Within the United States, citizens have a right
to determine state citizenship by choosing "the state wherein they reside." U.S. CONST.
amend XIV, § 1.
As a matter of normative political theory, Professor Rosen acknowledges that the
opportunity to leave a polity is a precondition to its exercise of legitimate authority. See
Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Of
Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 504 (2000) ("Peo-
ple in the original position would agree that an exit right is necessary because without
it a polity would reproduce the problem that led them to accommodate political per-
fectionists in the first place .... ); Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 1, at 1098 ("[T]he
option to choose where you live-what might be called the right of people to 'opt-out'
of the environment in which they find themselves and relocate to another-must be a
real one." (citation omitted)).
8 One of the few cases Professor Rosen cites that comes close is Commonwealth v.
Hartford, No. 95-98 (Ct. Com. P1. Sullivan County, Pa. Dec. 5, 1996). Rosen, Extraterrito-
riality, supra note 1, at 859 n.10. Ms. Hartford's conviction for interfering with the cus-
tody of the child's parent (not of aiding in the evasion of Pennsylvania's abortion law)
was reversed for failure to provide proper jury instructions on the elements of interfer-
ence with custody. Commonwealth v. Hartford, No. 00088PHL97 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct.
28, 1997).
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prosecuting wholly extraterritorial crimes by requiring that juries be
drawn from among the geographic community where the alleged
crime occurred. 9
The Federal Constitution is not so explicit, but a series of ele-
ments of constitutional structure were framed on the premise that a
state's legitimate authority is territorial. Boundaries between states
are territorially defined and unalterable; one state cannot be estab-
lished "within the Jurisdiction" of another without the former state's
consent.' ° The Extradition Clause of Article IV provides that an ac-
cused who flees from the state where a crime is committed must be
"delivered up [and] removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the
Crime;"" it acknowledges that the responsibility and prerogative for
punishment rests with the state within which the crime occurred.1
And other provisions are at odds with the notion that state residents
carry a personal law with them when they venture into other states.
3
9 See Appendix (listing such provisions). While such vicinage provisions are vari-
ously worded, their common import is to require trial by a jury of the jurisdiction
"where the crime was committed." A home state could not try a crime committed in a
host state since the constitutional provisions would mandate ajury of the foreign state.
10 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
I Id. § 2, cl. 2.
12 See Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Mar. 10, 1784) ("Unless
Citizens of one State transgressing within the pale of another be given up to be pun-
ished by the latter, they cannot be punished at all .... "), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 517 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). Madison was dis-
cussing the demand by South Carolina that Virginia extradite a Virginia citizen for an
offense in South Carolina. His assumption was that Virginia would have no authority
to punish its citizens for extraterritorial wrongs.
Professor Rosen's counterexample of an extradition by Michigan on the basis of a
crime that originated extraterritorially in Illinois, but came to fruition in Michigan, is
not to the contrary. See Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 864-65 (discussing
Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911)). Prosecution in such cases is consistent with
the understanding of the Framers of the Constitution: it is the consummation of the
crime "within the pale" of Michigan that provides the predicate for extradition.
13 The understanding that a citizen of one state venturing into another state
would be bound by the local law motivated the adoption of Article IV's Privileges and
Immunities Clause; it was necessary to guarantee that the host would not use its exclu-
sive power to the detriment of visitors from other states in the Union. For example,
the Court in Paul v. Virginia stated:
[W]ithout some provision of the kind removing from the citizens of each
State the disabilities of alienage in the other States ... the Republic would
have constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have consti-
tuted the Union that now exists .... It was not intended by the provision to
give to the laws of one State any operation in other States. They can have no
such operation, except by the permission, express or implied, of those States.
The special privileges which they confer must, therefore, be enjoyed at home,
unless the assent of other States to their enjoyment therein be given.
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The guaranty of a jury local to the situs of the alleged crime was em-
bodied in Article III's requirement that for federal offenses "the trial
of all Crimes . . .shall be held in the State where said Crimes shall
have been committed." 14 Antifederalist fears "that Article III's provi-
sion failed to preserve the common-law right to be tried by a 'jury of
the vicinage' . . . furnished part of the impetus for introducing
amendments to the Constitution that ultimately resulted in the jury
trial provisions of the Sixth [Amendment] . The Sixth Amendment
now guarantees, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . *..."16 A
strong line of cases holds that the Sixth Amendment is incorporated
against the states,17 and thus functions as an effective bar to wholly ex-
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180-81 (1868).
The Fugitive Slave Clause was tacit recognition that, absent constitutional con-
straint, local law could emancipate slaves who found their way across borders whatever
the rules in their home state. See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 536, 611
(1842) (Story, J.) ("[I]f the [C]onstitution had not contained [the Fugitive Slave
Clause] every non-slave-holding state in the Union would have been at liberty to have
declared free all runaway slaves coming within its limits .... "); id. at 647 (Wayne, J.,
concurring) (noting that absent the Fugitive Slave Clause, escaped slaves could be
freed in the North).
At the Constitutional Convention, Charles Pinkney first sought to qualify rights of
the host state under the Privileges and Immunities Clause by including a protection "in
favor of property in slaves," an effort that was rejected. NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BYJAMES MADISON 545 (A. Koch ed., 1966).
He then, along with Pierce Butler, sought to insert the Fugitive Slave Clause. Id. This
effort succeeded the next day. Id. at 552.
14 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
15 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 93-94 (1970).
16 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. For a recent account of the evolution of the vicinage
right, the importance of local juries as bulwarks of liberty, and the hostility of early
Americans to extraterritorial prosecution at the time of the framing of the Constitu-
tion, see Steven A. Engel, The Public's Vicinage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1658, 1685 (2000): "Like the English commentators, the Continental
Congress understood the vicinage presumption to be a structural property of the
'great right', one that served not only the interests of the defendant, but those of the
community as well." See also United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 7, 9-10 (1998) (dis-
missing a Missouri indictment on conspiracy and money laundering charges because
alleged charges occurred wholly within Florida and explaining vicinage requirements).
7 See, e.g., Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891, 897 (Alaska 1971) (holding the Sixth
Amendment applicable to states in requiring an impartial jury); Patterson v. Balkcom,
266 S.E.2d 179, 180-81 (Ga. 1980) (applying the Sixth Amendment to vicinage within
Georgia); Hayes v. Commonwealth, 698 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Ky. 1985) (construing the
Sixth Amendment to forbid state's prosecution of out-of-state theft); State v. Butler,
724 A.2d 657, 660 (Md. 1999) (finding the Sixth Amendment is at the root of bars
against extraterritorial criminal prosecution by the state); State v. Smith, 421 N.W.2d
315, 318-19 (Minn. 1988) (finding the Sixth Amendment preserves the territorial ju-
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traterritorial state prosecutions.
As I showed at exhaustive (and exhausting) length previously,18 re-
view of the historical context, contemporaneous commentary and
caselaw demonstrates that the understanding of the scope of the sov-
ereign power of states before the middle of the twentieth century did
not include the right to regulate citizens extraterritorially. Even in
the case of the most serious moral commitments, under generally ac-
cepted law a state could not impose those commitments on its citizens
within territory of neighboring states whose commitments differed.
Before the Civil War, for example, Justice Marshall was voicing the
common constitutional wisdom when he observed in Cohens v. Virginia
that it is "clear, that a State legislature, the State of Maryland, for ex-
ample, cannot punish those who, in another State, conceal a felony
committed in Maryland."' 9 This was the virtually unanimous opinion
ofjudicial authority in every state between the founding of the Repub-
risdiction principle and refusing jurisdiction over murder when no elements were
proven to have occurred in Minnesota); Miss. Publishers Corp. v. Coleman, 515 So. 2d
1163, 1166 (Miss. 1987) (denying writ of mandamus and affirming closure order pur-
suant to the Sixth Amendment vicinage requirement); State v. Preite, 564 P.2d 598,
599-602 (Mont. 1977) (vacating grand larceny convictions because prosecution failed
to prove venue pursuant to Sixth Amendment requirement); State v. Darroch, 287
S.E.2d 856, 860-65 (N.C. 1982) (holding that a state may take jurisdiction in accord
with the Sixth Amendment when the "principal felony" occurs in-state); State v. Beuke,
526 N.E.2d 274, 289 (Ohio 1988) (recognizing sufficient elements of murder were pre-
sent in a case tried in Ohio when death ensued in Indiana and holding that the Sixth
Amendment was not violated); State v. Harrington, 260 A.2d 692, 698 (Vt. 1969) ("In
the federal jurisdiction, if a crime is committed partly in one district and partly in an-
other, the offender may be tried in either district .... We think the Sixth Amendment
applies to interstate criminal jurisdiction with the same force and effect."); cf State v.
Morgan, 559 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Iowa 1997) ("After the Sixth Amendment was made
applicable by the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no reason to think any narrower
requirement would be applicable to the states.").
I must acknowledge that the authority here is not unanimous. Most recently, see,
for example, Price v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 4th 1046, 1057-70, cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 626
(2001), holding, in a situation involving venue for in-state crimes, that the Sixth
Amendment does not bind the states and citing cases in support of that proposition.
On the other hand, the most recent scholarly account of the question concludes:
The arguments that the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the
Vicinage Clause are particularly unconvincing. Those courts that have re-
jected incorporation have done so because they have found that the vicinage
right is not "fundamental" to a fair trial.... There is little doubt that the
Founders believed that the protection granted to the accused by the Vicinage
Clause was fundamental to a fair trial. Indeed, the Founders fought for the
vicinage right at every stage in their struggle for independence.
Engel, supra note 16, at 1707 (citations omitted).
18 Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 2, at 464-72.
19 19 U.S. 120, 191, 6 Wheat. 264, 426 (1821).
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lic and the Civil War.
Within a decade after the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption in
1868, the Supreme Court began to read the territorial restrictions on
state sovereignty into the definition of due process. At the turn of the
century, the Supreme Court struck down Louisiana's attempt to pun-
ish its citizens for making offensive insurance contracts in New York
on the ground that it "prohibits an act which under the Federal Con-
stitution the defendants had a right to perform.... [The state's]
power does not and cannot extend to prohibiting a citizen from mak-
ing contracts... outside of the limits and jurisdiction of the 
State."20
Although the Supreme Court qualified this limitation by allowing
prosecution of "[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to
produce and producing detrimental effects within it,"2 1 the justifying
effects were tangible and direct results adverse to the public order of
the prosecuting jurisdiction, not the diffuse butterfly's wings effects
on "public norms" that Professor Rosen would use to justify prosecu-
tion. Professor Rosen's laments regarding territorial limitations were
echoed in the pleas of Louisiana's court in Allgeyer that extraterritorial
prosecution was necessary to save "the sovereignty of the State" from
"mockery."2 The Supreme Court unanimously rejected those pleas in
23
Allgeyer and regularly maintained that rejection.
I do not understand Professor Rosen to question my reading of
this history, for he does not address it. Rather, he apparently main-
tains that modern caselaw has rendered earlier law irrelevant. Even if
20 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897).
21 Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 620, 624 (1927) (extraterritorial conspiracy
to import liquor into United States); Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) (ex-
traterritorial scheme directed to defraud state government on bids within the state).
165 U.S. at 585.
23 See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 411 (1930) (ruling that Texas cannot
affect the terms of a contract entered into by a Texas resident in Mexico without violat-
ing due process); Fid. & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U.S. 426, 436 (1926) (striking down
a statute seeking to prohibit out-of-state payments by corporations doing business in
New Mexico); St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 347, 349
(1922) (striking down a statute imposing a tax upon persons placing insurance extra-
territorially); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 367-77 (1918) (ruling that a
state cannot control contract entered into by a resident and a foreign corporation in a
foreign state); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 546-47 (1914) (ruling that a
state statute cannot impose tort liability for acts outside of state territory in the District
of Columbia); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914) ("[I]t would be im-
possible to permit the statutes of Missouri to operate beyond the jurisdiction of that
State and in the State of New York ... without throwing down the constitutional barri-
ers by which all the States are restricted within the orbits of their lawful author-
ity. ...").
2002]
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there has been an evolution away from territorial limitations, and as I
discuss below, the evolution has not gone as far as Professor Rosen be-
lieves, the unbroken rejection of extraterritorial state-enforced moral-
ism for the first 150 years of the Republic retains relevance in three
dimensions.
First, the historical practice and understanding of the territorial
limits of state regulation inform the construction of contemporary
constitutional claims. For a wing of the Court led by Justice Scalia, at
least, the understandings in place at the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment have been crucial guideposts in construing
24the demands of due process.
Second, the historical understanding of the limits of state power
suggests that a claim that states have "retained" authority under the
Tenth Amendment to regulate extraterritorially is weakly based: if the
states were not understood at the time of the framing to have author-
ity to regulate activities in other states, it is hard to claim that they "re-
tained" that authority.
25
Third, the fact that the American polity operated with reasonable
success under a territorialist regime-and indeed with greater norma-
tive diversity than obtains currently-raises questions about Professor
Rosen's claim that a territorially based system would "cripple" the pos-
sibilities for the normative benefits of federalism.26
C. The Virtues of Federalism
Professor Rosen and I agree that one of the virtues of the system
of American federalism is its capacity to further a variety of collective
24 See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 434 n.12 (1994) (relying on
the nineteenth-century practice rather than the eighteenth-century practice even
though judicial deference to verdicts was stronger earlier); Burnham v. Superior Court
of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 611 (1990) (noting that 1868, the year of the passage of the Four-
teenth Amendment, is "the crucial time" for the Court's analysis); Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (relying on the state of the law "at the time the Four-
teenth Amendment was ratified"); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 724-27, 730
(1988) (relying on ideas at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted and the
fact that those ideas have been relatively unchallenged since the adoption to find the
due Rprocess challenge "entirely without substance.").
See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 802 (1999) ("[The
Tenth] Amendment could only 'reserve' that which existed before."). In the interests
of full disclosure, I must acknowledge that Term Limits was a 5-4 decision, and the dis-
sentingJustices adopted a default rule allowing the states any powers not affirmatively
forbidden by the Federal Constitution. Id. at 926 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
26 Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 856.
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27
purposes. Citizens of Utah can establish a polity that furthers tradi-
tional values of family and social order, while citizens of Vermont can
simultaneously embed a sense of individualism and pluralism in their
political structure. Our society is richer for the existence of both poli-
ties. The Supreme Court's federalism decisions recognize these vir-
tues in their praising of self-government, responsiveness, and the plu-
ralistic potential of the "laboratories of the states."28
But the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of federalism does not
end with collective virtues; in recent years, the Justices have regularly
recognized that one of the key values of American federalism is its ca-
pacity to "preserve freedom."2"  By "freedom," the Supreme Court
does not mean merely the collective freedom of state polities from
federal constraint, but the individual liberties of citizens, and the
openness of American society that flows from those liberties. The
variation between states is desirable because it provides an opportu-
nity for individual citizens to mold identities and choose their futures,
and because an open national community follows from this right to
experimentation. This characteristic of federalism does not loom
large in Professor Rosen's account, for he appears to see the signal vir-
tue of federalism as its indifference between regimes of freedom and
those of perfectionist morality. 30 But this is neither the view of the Su-
27 See id. at 882 ("[O]ne of federalism's great merits [is] the space it provides for
rich golitical heterogeneity at the subfederal levels of government.").
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single coura-
geous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."); see also, e.g., Adler &
Kreimer, The New Etiquette, supra note 2, at 77-82 (discussing the values of federalism);
Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, supra note 2, at 67 ("[T]he argument for devolution of
power to state and local governments in contemporary cases regularly relies on claims
about the virtues of federalism as a means of achieving other values.").
29 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 689 (1999) (ScaliaJ.) (discussing the "protection of liberty" as a focus of federal-
ism); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) (ScaliaJ.) ("Th[e] separation of
the two spheres is one of the Constitution's structural protections of liberty."); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[I]t was the in-
sight of the framers that freedom was enhanced by the creation of two governments,
not one."); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (O'Connor, J.)
("[Tihe Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the
protection of individuals."); Gregory v. Ashcroft 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991)
(O'Connor, J.) ("[A] healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."); Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun,J., dissenting) ("[Federalism secures
to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.").
30 See Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 911-13 (advocating a "hard" as op-
2002]
982 UNIVERSITY OF PENNS YL VANIA LA W REVIEW
preme Court nor that of the Framers. American federalism is not in-
different in the contest between liberty and order; it is as a "double
security" against government infringements on freedom that the
Court is solicitous of state prerogatives.
Federalism preserves freedom in part by the constitutionally pro-
tected character of emigration rights: a citizen of Texas32 who finds
that state's prohibitions on same sex relations too onerous can move
to Vermont, while a citizen of New York whose desire to own assault
weapons is unrealizable can move to Montana. Neither Texas nor
New York can prevent the emigration; neither Vermont nor Montana
can refuse the immigrants. 3
In the same way, federalism preserves freedom when the gay man
in Texas or the gun enthusiast in New York partakes of the liberties of
Vermont, or California, or Montana on a temporary basis, and the
former protection is not a substitute for the latter.34 The possibility of
sampling the liberties of sister states offers a continual challenge to
justify the decision of the home state to deny those liberties, and a se-
curity against the efforts of any faction to capture a state's authority in
order to impose its own enthusiasms on unwilling minorities. In my
view, what Professor Rosen denigrates as "travel-evasion " 5 is part and
parcel of the promise of American federalism: that each citizen may
take advantage of the liberties offered by any state.
An extraterritorial statute raises a final issue of freedom. One of
posed to "soft" regime of legal pluralism).
31 The Court regularly cites the characterization in THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James
Madison) of federalism as a "double security" for the "rights of the people" and the
promise of liberty. E.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921-22 (1997); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Gregory v. Ash-
croft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991).
32 While Georgia, home of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), has deter-
mined that its constitutional right of privacy protects against state prosecution of "sod-
omy" in Powellv. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998), the state of Texas stands firm in its
efforts to criminalize sexual relations between those of the same sex, Lawrence v. State
41 S.W.3d 349, 362 (Tex. App. 2001).
33 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 492 (1999) (striking down a California statute
limiting welfare benefits to new residents of the state); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 622 (1969) (striking down welfare limitation statutes in Connecticut, Pennsylva-
nia, and the District of Columbia); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 170-71 (1941)
(finding unconstitutional a California statute which criminalized bringing into the
state any nonresident indigent person); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49
(1868) (holding unconstitutional a tax imposed on leaving the state).
Indeed, it is often those who are most in need of protection who will be least
able to take advantage of the emigration right which Professor Rosen would recognize.
35 Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 856.
[Vol. 150: 973
LINES IN THE SAND
the elements of a legal system that supports the capacity of citizens to
frame and follow their own ends is its public character and predict-
ability. A citizen who knows that when she crosses the boundary be-
tween Pennsylvania and New Jersey, she moves from Pennsylvania's
law to New Jersey's, can plan her life with some precision to comply
with legal obligations. By contrast, under Professor Rosen's scheme,
the citizen who travels always must be aware of not one but two or
more systems of criminal law as she travels, the applicability of which
will vary depending on the degree of "state interest" conflicting or
shared between the relevant states. This is a recipe not for freedom
but for fear.
D. The Nature of Citizenship
Finally, Professor Rosen and I differ on the meaning of American
citizenship. For him there is a "dialectic" between state citizenship
and federal citizenship.36 In Professor Rosen's view, the woman who
resides in Pennsylvania, but seeks an abortion in New Jersey, travels
inescapably as a Pennsylvania citizen, and any effort to take advantage
of the liberties offered by New Jersey or another neighboring state is
an improper evasion of her duties as a Pennsylvanian. A doctrine that
facilitates her efforts pays insufficient homage to the importance of
state citizenship.
To my mind, this interpretation is both descriptively inaccurate
and historically obtuse. At the time the United States was founded,
one could conceive of American citizenship as derived from a more
basic identification with each of the component states, but the time
has long past when the "United States of America" was a plural con-
struction. One of the areas of disagreement surrounding the Civil
War was precisely the question of whether state or federal citizenship
was primary. Proponents of union maintained that national citizen-
ship was a freestanding allegiance; proponents of states' rights main-
tained that national citizenship existed only insofar as the citizen
could claim state citizenship. As a political matter, the Civil War re-
solved the issue by force of arms, and the resolution was embodied in
the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: persons born
or naturalized in the United States are indissolubly citizens of the
United States, and only derivatively or contingently citizens of the
"State wherein they reside."37  After adoption of the Fourteenth
Rosen, Extraternitoriaity, supra note 1, at 910.
37 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Amendment, United States citizenship is "paramount and dominant
instead of being subordinate and derivative."
3
This conclusion is mirrored in the self-understanding of American
citizens. At the time of the Civil War, Robert E. Lee resigned his fed-
eral commission, and renounced his oath of allegiance because as a
"Virginian" he could not bear to honor that oath. It is hard today to
find a citizen of the United States who conceives of her primary iden-
tity as a "Virginian" or a "Pennsylvanian" or an "Oregonian," rather
than an "American," and our nation is stronger for this fact.
In my view, it is precisely the fact that a resident of Pennsylvania
comes to New Jersey as an American citizen that entitles her without
blame to take advantage of the "privileges and immunities" offered by
New Jersey, whether to wager on games of chance or to end an un-
wanted pregnancy. This does no violence to the authority of Pennsyl-
vania within its boundaries but recognizes that the primary moral
community to which we all owe allegiance is that of the United States
of America.
II. THE MESSAGE OF MODERN CASELAW
A. Sovereignty and Due Process
Professor Rosen believes that modem caselaw upholds the propo-
sition that a state may punish its citizens for any violations of its norms
anywhere in the world. I have previously argued that, notwithstand-
ing the acceptance of extraterritorial federal prosecutions, the more
modern cases accept wholly extraterritorial criminal prosecution by
states only in circumstances where there is no competing legal permis-
38 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389 (1918). In arguing for the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congressman ReverdyJohnson said:
[A]s it now stands[,] ... [w]ho is a citizen of the United States is an open
question. The decision of the courts and the doctrine of the commentators is,
that every man who is a citizen of a State becomes ipso facto a citizen of the
United States; but there is no definition as to how citizenship can exist in the
United States except through the medium of a citizenship in a State.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2893 (1866) (statement of Rep. Johnson); see also
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 182 (1941) (Jackson,J, concurring) ("This clause
was adopted to make United States citizenship the dominant and paramount alle-
giance among us."); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 510 (1939) (Rob-
ertsJ.) ("The first sentence of the Amendment settled the old controversy as to citi-
zenship .... Thenceforward citizenship of the United States became primary and
citizenship of a State secondary.").
39 See Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra, note 1, at 944-45 (citing several state cases and
the dual sovereignty doctrine).
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sion granted by the sister state where the conduct occurs and where
there is some concrete impact on the territorial interests of the prose-
cuting state. Federal relations to other nations are simply not the
same as relations between states that are bound by the comity imposed
by the constitution.
Skiriotes v. Florida, the only case either of us has found in which the
U.S. Supreme Court upholds a state prosecution for wholly extraterri-
torial conduct solely on the basis of citizenship, has broad language
regarding the extraterritorial authority of a state over its citizens.
But in fact the opinion upheld the prosecution based on acts on the
41
high seas, where no competing state sovereignty could be interposed.
The opinion explicitly relies on the proposition articulated by Justice
Holmes in The Hamilton: "'the bare fact of the parties being outside
the territory in a place belonging to no other sovereign would not limit the
authority of the State, as accepted by civilized theory."4
By contrast, Nielsen v. Oregon,43 as Professor Rosen acknowledges, is
directly inconsistent with his preferred schema. That case reversed as
unconstitutional Oregon's effort to prosecute Nielsen for fishing with
a "purse net," in a fashion authorized by the laws of Washington, in
waters over which Washington and Oregon had concurrent jurisdic-
tion.44 By its terms Nielsen states that when "the opinion of the legisla-
tures of the two States is different.., the one State cannot enforce its
opinion against that of the other, at least as to an act done within the
40 313 U.S. 69, 78 (1941).
41 Id. at 77.
42 Id. at 78 (emphasis added) (quoting The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 403 (1907)).
For Justice Holmes, who wrote both The Hamilton and Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280
(1911), upon which Professor Rosen relies, the italicized qualification was no accident.
As Holmes articulated the matter in another case:
[I]n regions subject to no sovereign, like the high seas, or to no law that civi-
lized countries would recognize as adequate, such countries may treat some
relations between their citizens as governed by their own law, and keep to
some extent the old notion of personal sovereignty alive.... But the general
and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done.... For anotherjurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor,
to treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place where
he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference with
the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which
the other state concerned justly might resent.
Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909).
43 212 U.S. 315 (1909).
44 Id. at 316.
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limits of that other State."45
46Professor Rosen maintains that Heath v. Alabama effectively over-
rules Nielsen, quoting language from Heath in which the Court says
that "'Nielsen is limited to its unusual facts.'
47 As I discuss below,48
Professor Rosen is intrigued with the question of whether the analysis
of extraterritoriality in Bigelow v. Virginia is "holding" or "dictum.,
49
Yet his discussion of Heath is somewhat cavalier in eliding the fact that
the language he quotes is directed not to Nielsen's holding-which he
seeks to discredit-but to the observation that Nielsen "indicates... in
dicta, that where States have concurrent jurisdiction over a criminal
offense, the first State to prosecute thereby bars prosecution by any
other State"-a point of tangential relevance to our disagreement. °
The Heath Court goes on to quote with approval from Nielsen's
holding: "'It is enough to decide, as we do, that for an act done
within the territorial limits of the State of Washington under authority
and license from that State one cannot be prosecuted and punished
by the State of Oregon."'' It holds Nielsen inapplicable, however, to
"prosecutions for offenses proscribed by both States."52 In the situa-
tions that divide Professor Rosen and me, the "offense" is not "pro-
scribed by both states;" like the defendant in Nielsen, and unlike the
defendant in Heath, the citizen of the home state is acting "under li-
cense from" the territorial host state. It is thus hard to read Heath as
overruling Nielsen's bar to Professor Rosen's regime of extraterritorial
moralism.
States have been reluctant to assert extraterritorial moralism by
criminal prosecution in general, and still more chary of seeking to
prosecute conduct that is sanctioned by the laws of the state where it
occurs. As a result, we have had relatively little discussion by the Su-
preme Court of the status of the efforts that Professor Rosen would
foster. Indeed, as best either of us can tell, the sole direct modern
discussion of the issue is contained in a case growing out of the early
phases of the modern constitutional controversy over abortion. In
Bigelow v. Virginia, Virginia sought to prosecute the editor of a Virginia
45 Id. at 321.
474 U.S. 82 (1985).
47 Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 953 (quoting Heath, 474 U.S. at 91).
48 Infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
49 Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 891.
50 Heath, 474 U.S. at 91 (emphasis added).
51 Id. (quoting Nielson v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315, 321 (1909)).
52 Id.
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newspaper for publishing an advertisement for abortion services that
were-at the time-legal in New York, but illegal in Virginia. 3 The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that, after "as-
sessing the First Amendment interest at stake and weighing it against
the public interest allegedly served by the regulation," Virginia's
prosecution was unconstitutional.54 Justice Blackmun's analysis began
as follows:
[T]he placement services advertised in appellant's newspaper were le-
gally provided in New York at that time. The Virginia Legislature could
not have regulated the advertiser's activity in New York, and obviously
could not have proscribed the activity in that State. Huntington v. Attrill,
146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892). Neither could Virginia prevent its residents from
traveling to New York to obtain those services or, as the State conceded, Tr. of
Oral Arg. 29, prosecute them for going there. See United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745, 757-759 (1966); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-631
(1969); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S., at 200. Virginia possessed no authority to
regulate the services provided in New York-the skills and credentials of
the New York physicians and of the New York professionals who assisted
them, the standards of the New York hospitals and clinics to which pa-
tients were referred, or the practices and charges of the New York refer-
ral services.
A State does not acquire power or supervision over the internal affairs of an-
other State merely because the welfare and health of its own citizens may be affected
when they travel to that State. It may seek to disseminate information so as
to enable its citizens to make better informed decisions when they leave.
But it may not, under the guise of exercising internal police powers, bar
a citizen of another State from disseminating information about an activ-
ity that is legal in that State.5 5
Later in the opinion, he continued:
The State, of course, has a legitimate interest in maintaining the quality
of medical care provided within its borders. Barsky v. Board of Regents,
347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954). No claim has been made, however, that this
particular advertisement in any way affected the quality of medical serv-
ices within Virginia. As applied to Bigelow's case, the statute was di-
rected at the publishing of informative material relating to services of-
fered in another State and was not directed at advertising by a referral
agency or a practitioner whose activity Virginia had authority or power to
regulate.
To be sure, the agency-advertiser's practices, although not then ille-
gal, may later have proved to be at least "inimical to the public interest"
in New York. S.P.S. Consultants, Inc. v. Lefkowitz, 333 F. Supp. 1373, 1378
53 421 U.S. 809, 811-13 (1975).
54 Id. at 826, 826-29.
55 Id. at 822-25 (emphases added) (footnotes omitted).
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(SDNY 1971). But this development would not justify a Virginia statute that
forbids Virginians from using in New York the then legal services of a local New
York agency. Here, Virginia is really asserting an interest in regulating
what Virginians may hear or read about the New York services. It is, in ef-
fect, advancing an interest in shielding its citizens from information
about activities outside Virginia's borders, activities that Virginia's police
powers do not reach. This asserted interest, even if understandable, was en-
titled to little, if any, weight under the circumstances. 56
Professor Rosen, following Professor Regan, engages in a lengthy
effort to show that the rejection of Virginia's extraterritorial power in
Bigelow should be characterized as obiter dicta.57 The substance of his
argument seems to be that because the Bigelow Court could have
reached the same result by relying solely on a "principle that a state
may not control its citizens' knowledge of what activities are permissi-
ble in other states," s it did in fact rely solely on that principle.
But the opinion did not limit itself to Professor Rosen's principle.
Fairly read, as part of its multifactor balancing discussion, Bigelow
evaluated Virginia's interest in preventing its citizens from obtaining
abortions in New York and rejected the proposition that the state's po-
lice powers extend to precluding its citizens from taking advantage of
the moral climate of neighboring states.
Certainly, this is the understanding of then-Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in Bigelow, which attacked what he characterized as the major-
ity's "major premise that Virginia could not regulate the relations of
the advertiser with its residents since these occurred in New York."59
Lower courts, when confronted with the issue have held as much.0 As
56 Id. at 827-28 (first and fourth emphases added) (footnote omitted).
57 Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 891-94.
58 Id. at 893. He also suggests that the Bigelow discussion should be devalued be-
cause it "did not give careful consideration to the extent of a state's extraterritorial
powers" and did not discuss Professor Rosen's favorite cases. Id. In fact, as the opinion
notes, Virginia conceded it had no extraterritorial powers to regulate its citizens' abor-
tions in New York, supra text accompanying note 55, and the cases which Professor
Rosen cites were adduced by Justice Rehnquist's dissent attacking what he character-
ized as the majority's major premise. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 834 n.2 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (citing Skiriotes and Strassheim in support of his disagreement with the limi-
tations on states' extraterritorial power as found by the majority). The fact thatJustice
Blackmun did not reply in detail may mean thatJustice Blackmun is not craftsmanlike;
it hardly means that what Justice Rehnquist characterized as the opinion's "major
premise," id., is dictum.
59 421 U.S. at 834 n.2 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
60 See Rahmani v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 932, 936 (E.D. Va. 1998)
("A state cannot invalidate the lawful statutes of another state or penalize activity that
lawfully occurs in another state .... [T]he Virginia General Assembly has no power to
invalidate lawful gambling taking place wholly outside of Virginia."); Florida v. Friends
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to whether Justice Rehnquist and I (an odd couple, to be sure) better
characterize the Bigelow majority than do Professors Rosen and Regan,
I encourage interested readers to review the opinion for themselves.
It will not do, however, to spend too much time on whether in the
abstract the Bigelow analysis of a quarter century ago is better charac-
terized as holding or dictum, since for the current Supreme Court ma-
jority, even yesterday's holdings do not constitute serious obstacles to
the accomplishment of today's purposes.6 For a positivist window on
the precedential status of Bigelow, the best available evidence is con-
tained in two cases the Supreme Court has handed down since my
original articles were published, one of which Professor Rosen curi-
ously ignores.
The case which Professor Rosen discusses is United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co., 2 in which the Supreme Court upheld a federal-not
a state-regulation preventing broadcasters located in states prohibit-
ing gambling from carrying advertisements for gambling in states
where it was legal. 63 Professor Rosen believes that Edge Broadcasting
of Children, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1221, 1226 (N.D. Fla. 1986) (rejecting construction of
Florida statutes that would regulate Florida women who travel to Georgia to give birth
and place children for adoption); Bruce Church, Inc. v. United Farm Workers of Am.,
816 P.2d 919, 924-28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting efforts to sanction labor organiza-
tion for extraterritorial boycotts which were legal where they occurred); see also Am.
Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (considering New
York's attempt to regulate transmission of obscene materials to minors over the Inter-
net "an unconstitutional projection of New York law into conduct that occurs wholly
outside New York").
61 Compare Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 594-
95 (1983) (upholding private cause of action for Title VI disparate impact violation),
and Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566-69 (1974) (granting relief under Tite VI for dis-
parate impact discrimination), with Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (hold-
ing that there is no private cause of action for violation of Title VI disparate impact
regulations); compare City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-10 (1983) (holding
threat of future application of lethal chokeholds did not constitute irreparable injury),
with Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1047 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that
threat of bad public relations for presidential candidate constituted irreparable in-
jury); compare Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (holding that Con-
gress could authorize damage actions against states under the Commerce Clause), with
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (overruling Union Gas); compare
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1980) (stating that the Eleventh Amendment
does not, by its terms, apply to actions in state court), with Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 736 (1999) (rejecting Thiboutot's reading of the Eleventh Amendment and the
text of Constitution). To be sure, Bigelow itself was none too deferential to the prece-
dent of Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 819-20
(doubting the vitality and applicability of Valentine).
62 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
63 Id. at 436.
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repudiates the territorialist premises of Bigelow.
4
If so, the Court proceeds in a most oblique fashion. The Supreme
Court in Edge Broadcasting recognized the "congressional policy of bal-
ancing the interests of lottery and nonlottery States"65 as sufficient to
sustain against First Amendment challenge federal regulations barring
advertisements of Virginia lotteries by interstate broadcasters located
in North Carolina (which bars lotteries).66 But this conclusion does
not implicate the question of whether North Carolina itself may
prosecute its citizens for playing the Virginia lottery.
Congress's regulatory authority, unlike that of the states, extends
to the entire country. As a matter of federal policy under the Com-
merce Clause, if Congress wanted to encourage North Carolina resi-
dents to gamble in Virginia, wholly in defiance of North Carolina's
policy, or if, conversely, it sought to suppress interstate gambling by
Virginia residents despite Virginia's enthusiasm, it would have been
equally empowered to do so. 6' These are wholly federal matters, going
to the proper exercise of federal authority over the channels of inter-
state commerce and the federal desire to achieve balance between
competing state regimes.
The federal interest invoked in Edge Broadcasting was not a "deriva-
tive" one as Professor Rosen asserts. 68 North Carolina itself has an "in-
terest" sufficient to seek to prohibit gambling on its own territory and
to seek to dissuade its residents from gambling in neighboring Vir-
ginia; Edge Broadcasting recognizes the separate and distinct power of
the federal government to regulate the message disseminated by an in-
64 Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 894-95.
65 509 U.S. at 428 (emphasis added).
66 Id. at 427-36.
67 As the Court explained in Edge Broadcasting:
Congress might have continued to ban all radio or television lottery adver-
tisements, even by stations in States that have legalized lotteries. This it did
not do. Neither did it permit stations such as Edge, located in a nonlottery
State, to carry lottery ads if their signals reached into a State that sponsors lot-
teries; similarly, it did not forbid stations in a lottery State such as Virginia
from carrying lottery ads if their signals reached into an adjoining State such
as North Carolina where lotteries were illegal.
Id. at 428.
68 Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 879. Justice Stevens' dissent does char-
acterize the interest as "derivative." Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. at 437 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). ButJustice Stevens immediately goes on to state: "Of course, North Carolina
law does not, and, presumably, could not, bar its citizens from traveling across the state
line and participating in the Virginia lottery." Id. at 437 n.1. It hardly seems sporting
to choose one piece of dictum in a dissent while ignoring its immediate neighbor.
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terstate broadcaster on North Carolina's soil. But the case gives North
Carolina no authority to prosecute its residents for disregarding its
norms within a sister state where gambling is legal, or to prosecute the
broadcaster itself. Indeed, the Court's understanding of the federal
interest in Edge Broadcasting seems to be predicated on a territorialist
account of state sovereignty. The federal interest approved was not
primarily in preventing North Carolinians from obtaining the broad-
cast information in question, but in assuring that North Carolina's
authority over the acts of broadcasters within its own territory was not
compromised. 6 When the Supreme Court finally addressed federal
efforts to shore up local moralisms extraterritorially by preventing
broadcasters in states where gambling was legal from conveying in-
formation to listeners in states where gambling was illegal, it invali-
dated them.7 ° This is not a strong line of authority for extraterritorial
69 The Court stated:
[T]o prevent Virginia's lottery policy from dictating what stations in a neigh-
boring State may air ..... advances the governmental interest in enforcing the
restriction in nonlottery States, while not interfering with the policy of lottery
States like Virginia. We think this would be the case even if it were true, which
it is not, that applying the general statutory restriction to Edge, in isolation,
would no more than marginally insulate the North Carolinians in the North
Carolina counties served by Edge from hearing lottery ads.
Id. at 429-30. The Court also noted the federal government's ability generally to ac-
commodate states with differing policies:
Edge has chosen to transmit from a location near the border between two ju-
risdictions with different rules, and rests its case on the spillover from the ju-
risdiction across the border. Were we to adopt Edge's approach, we would
treat a station that is close to the line as if it were on the other side of it, effec-
tively extending the legal regime of Virginia inside North Carolina.
Id. at 435-36.
70 See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States ("GNOBA"), 527
U.S. 173, 176 (1999) (holding that federal prohibitions on "broadcast advertising of
lotteries and casino gambling... may not be applied to advertising of private casino
gambling that are broadcast by radio or television stations located.., where such
gambling is legal"). In characterizing Edge Broadcasting, the GNOBA Court noted that
"in Edge we identified the federal interest furthered by § 1304's partial broadcast ban as
the 'congressional policy of balancing the interests of lottery and nonlottery States."'
Id. at 187 (quoting Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. at 428). The opinion continued:
As we stated in Edge: "[A] pplying the restriction to a broadcaster such as [re-
spondent] directly advances the governmental interest in enforcing the re-
striction in nonlottery States, while not interfering with the policies of lottery
States like Virginia .... [W]e judge the validity of the restriction in this case
by the relation it bears to the general problem of accommodating the policies
of both lottery and nonlottery States."
Id. at 194-95 n.8 (alterations in original) (quoting Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. at 429-
30). The Court continued quoting from Edge Broadcasting: "'Instead of favoring either
the lottery or the nonlottery State, Congress opted to' accommodate the policies of
both; and it was '[t]his congressional policy of balancing the interests of lottery and
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moralism.
Professor Rosen's account of current precedent fails entirely to
mention the more recent decision of BMW of North America v. Gore,71 in
which the Court reviewed the award of a $2 million punitive damage
judgment levied against BMW by an Alabama court on the basis of a
failure to disclose defects in a car that damaged the Alabama con-
sumer by $4,000.72 In the course of discussing the plaintiff's claim that
the punitive damage judgment was justified by the aggregate evil of
BMW's similar conduct in other states, the majority opinion took the
position that because the conduct in question was in fact legal in the
sister states where it occurred, it would be a violation of basic canons
of constitutional federalism for Alabama to seek to "impose its own
policy choice on neighboring states.", 3 Alabama, according to the Su-
preme Court majority, may not "impose sanctions on BMW in order to
deter conduct that is lawful in other jurisdictions. The Court
quoted from Bigelow the proposition that a "'State does not acquire
power or supervision over the internal affairs of another State merely
because the welfare and health of its own citizens may be affected
when they travel to that State.'
7
I do not wish to overplay Gore. The case was decided by a vote of
five to four. It referred to Alabama's effort to punish the extraterrito-
rial activities of a foreign corporation, and so is not direct authority
regarding the question that divides Professor Rosen and me. And, as
Justice Scalia's dissent points out, the discussion of Bigelow occurs in
the course of considering a theory that was in fact not relied upon by
the Alabama Supreme Court.76 Notwithstanding these qualifications,
it does appear that at least the five Justices who subscribe to the Gore
majority do not regard the discussion in Bigelow as dictum, and con-
tinue to regard efforts by restrictive states to interfere with activities in
nonlottery States' that was 'the substantial governmental interest that satisfie[d] Central
Hudson."' Id. at 195 n.8 (alteration in original) (quoting Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. at
428).
71 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
72 At trial, $4 million in punitive damages were awarded; the Alabama Supreme
Court reduced the award to $2 million, finding that to be a "constitutionally reason-
able" amount. Id. at 565-67.
73 Id. at 571, 568-74.
74 Id. at 573.
75 Id. at 571 n.16 (quoting Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 824).
76 See id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Alabama Supreme Court-whether
it was constitutionally required to or not-'expressly disclaimed any reliance on acts
that occurred in other jurisdictions."' (quoting id. at 567)).
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permissive states with constitutional suspicion, a suspicion that lower
courts would be well advised to share."
I must acknowledge now, as I acknowledged earlier, that the
Court's articulated due process limits on the assertion of jurisdiction
in civil cases have evolved during the twentieth century into a multi-
factor balancing approach. At least in the civil area, a state's effort to
apply its own law must be based on "'a significant contact... creating
state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fun-
damentally unfair.'- 8 The evaluation of "unfairness" may apparently
be informed by "the tradition in place when the constitutional provi-
sion was adopted" or "subsequent practice,"7 9 and even after the New
Deal revolution, cases still reflectjudicial skepticism about the propri-
ety of wholly extraterritorial regulation.8° In light of this evolution
and the other relevant precedent, the position I articulated almost a
77 This suspicion is heightened by a series of cases with which Professor Rosen de-
clines to come to grips. In Law of Choice, supra note 2, at 477 n.83, I discuss Robinson v.
California:
[I]n Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 665-66 (1962), reh'g denied, 371
U.S. 905 (1965), the Court took as given the constraint that California could
punish legitimately only for the actual use of narcotics "within the state." In
Robinson, although the evidence clearly demonstrated the recent use of nar-
cotics, the jury did not necessarily find use within California. The court,
therefore, treated the punishment as resting impermissibly on status, rather
than conduct.
Professor Rosen ignores Robinson.
In a series of tax cases, which I discussed in Whoever Treasures Freedom, supra note 2,
at 934-35, the Court suggests that due process requires that the effort to impose obliga-
tions must be predicated on "a connection to the activity itself, rather than a connec-
tion only to the actor," Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 778
(1992). See also, e.g., Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551,
555-59 (1977) (considering whether National Geographic's activities in California were
extensive enough to establish the requisite "nexus" with the state for imposition of a
sales tax); Am. Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451, 458 (1965) (requiring "'nexus' between
the taxing state and the taxpayer" as the "prerequisite on state power to tax"); Treich-
ler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251, 256 (1949) (disallowing a state inheritance tax on prop-
erty located outside the state); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 476 (1925) (describ-
ing as "limited" the "power of each of the States to reach by taxation tangible
personalty physically beyond its boundaries."). Professor Rosen does not address these
cases.
78 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981)).
7q Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730 (1988).
80 See FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293, 302 (1960) (expressing belief
that Nebraska's power to regulate extraterritorial activity of a Nebraska corporation
might be constitutionally limited); cf State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370
U.S. 451, 455 (1962) (holding that Allgeyer principle incorporated into McCarran-
Ferguson Act limited state regulation of insurance).
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decade ago thus still seems to be a fair account of the caselaw:
[T]he extent of Bigelow's continued vitality... turn[s] on the level of
"significance" the Court is willing to accord to the state "interest" offered
as justification for the efforts to prevent or punish extraterritorial abor-
tions [and mutatis mutandis, other controversial activities]. The interests
must be such that the application of home-state law is "neither arbitrary
nor fundamentally unfair."...
If the interest the Court recognizes in regulating abortion is primarily
the interest in preventing the woman from engaging in what is regarded
by her home state as an immoral act, then the "unfairness" of punishing
an act approved by the jurisdiction in which it occurs might well raise
sufficient due process concerns to invalidate prosecutorial efforts.8'
B. Commerce Clause
Professor Rosen acknowledges that the Supreme Court has regu-
larly determined that the Commerce Clause precludes states from
regulating extraterritorially8 ' As I pointed out in my earlier article,
this is not a recent innovation.83 Nonetheless, Professor Rosen under-
takes to "[a]nalyze[] more closely" the Commerce Clause doctrine
with an eye to limiting its impact on the capacity of states to control
81 Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 2, at 478.
82 Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 919-20; see also, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst.,
491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) ("[T]he 'Commerce Clause... precludes the application of a
state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders,
whether or not the commerce has effects within the State."' (second alteration in
original) (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982) (plurality opin-
ion))); id. at 336 n.13 ("' [A]ny attempt "directly" to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction
over persons or property... exceed[s] the inherent limits of the State's power."'
(quoting Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643)); id. at 336 ("[A] statute that directly controls com-
merce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits
of the enacting State's authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute's extra-
territorial reach was intended by the legislature."); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294
U.S. 511, 521 (1935) (accepting that given the constraints of the Commerce Clause,
"New York has no power to project its legislation into Vermont by regulating the price
to be paid in that state for milk acquired there").
See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U.S. 133, 143-44 (1905) ("To sustain...
the ruling of the court below would require us to decide that the law of Iowa operated
in another State so as to invalidate a lawful contract as to interstate commerce made in
such other State .... ); Bowman v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 498 (1888)
(striking down state prohibition on importation of liquor because "[i] t is not an exer-
cise of the jurisdiction of the State over persons and property within its limits... [but]
is an attempt to exert that jurisdiction over persons and property within the limits of
other States"); see also W. Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547 (1914) (unani-
mous decision) (Holmes, J.) (holding that statute imposing tort liability for negligent
delivery of telegram outside of state territory violates the Commerce Clause).
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the actions of their own citizens beyond their borders. 4
He begins by observing that the Commerce Clause limits only
state regulations of commerce. With this point, I have no quarrel; it is
an observation grounded in the constitutional text, and in recent
years the Supreme Court has recast its jurisprudence to emphasize
that not every activity should be characterized as "commercial." But
quite a large number of morally controversial activities-the purchase
of marijuana, gambling, assisted suicide, and abortions immediately
come to mind-do involve sales of goods or services, which even un-
der the new dispensation of the United States v. Lopez"' and United States
v. Morrison" majorities fall squarely within the Federal Commerce
Clause.
Perhaps realizing that this limit does not carve out a great deal of
territory, Professor Rosen undertakes to construct two doctrinal inno-
vations in order to blunt the caselaw's established hostility to extrater-
ritorial state regulations of commerce.
First, he maintains, in the absence of any direct support in prece-
dent, that the prohibition of extraterritorial regulations applies only
to "protectionist" regulations, not to "health and safety" regulations.m
84 Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 920.
85 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
86 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
87 See, e.g., United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 254 (3d Cir. 2000) (upholding
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act as exercise of commerce power); United
States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1074 (8th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Weslin, 156
F.3d 292,296 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1071 (1999) (same). In addition, the
Supreme Court is on record as accepting the proposition that interstate travel by indi-
viduals, even for noneconomic purposes, is "commerce" in the relevant sense. See Ed-
wards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172 (1941) ("[lIt is settled beyond question that the
transportation of persons is 'commerce' within the meaning of [the Commerce
Clause]."); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 471 (1917) (upholding statute
prohibiting interstate transportation of women for any "immoral purpose," regardless
of commercial gain, against Commerce Clause challenge).
88 Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 922. I am gratified that Professor Rosen
is a careful enough scholar to note that I had suggested that a distinction between
"protectionist" and "non-protectionist" extraterritorial regulations might be molded
out of current doctrine. See id. at 925 n.295 (citing Kreimer, Choice of Law, supra note
2, at 496). I fear, however, that Professor Rosen has mistaken what I characterized as a
"modification" of "soft" Commerce Clause doctrine, Kreimer, Choice of Law, supra note
2, at 496, for a "strong argument," Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 922.
The primary case Professor Rosen cites for his analysis, Head v. New Mexico Board of
Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963), seems an odd source from which to mine dicta, for it
was a case of wholly domestic conduct. Head upheld an order by a New Mexico court
enjoining a New Mexico newspaper and radio station "from accepting or publishing
within the State of New Mexico advertising of any nature from Abner Roberts which
quotes prices or terms on eyeglasses," on the basis of a statute "applicable alike to 'any
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These are categories of formidable obscurity, for one person's public
welfare is another person's protectionism.89 Thus, one might quite
sensibly understand an effort by Texas to protect against the corrosive
"third party effects" of extraterritorial sexual experimentation by its
residents as an attempt to prevent the importation of the memories of
morally problematic extraterritorial experiences. This seems as "pro-
tectionist" a goal as the effort to exclude unclean waste or unclean
migrants. 90 Thus far, the Court has not limited the reach of its Com-
merce Clause protection against extraterritorial regulation in health
and safety cases, and it should not do so. Equally important, cases
which uphold "health and safety" justifications in other Commerce
Clause contexts do not rely on "morals," which seem to be the key
"third party effects" on which Professor Rosen relies.
Second, Professor Rosen suggests that the bar against extraterrito-
rial regulation is inapplicable to efforts by states to regulate their own
citizens. In this, Professor Rosen not only travels beyond precedent
but also directly contradicts it. As he recognizes, Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig, Inc.,91 the leading case on the Commerce Clause strictures
against extraterritorial regulation, invalidated an effort by the state of
person' within the State of New Mexico." Id. at 427, 429 (emphasis added). The Court
held that although the prospective advertiser and some of the audience were Texas
residents, "as applied here to prevent the publication in New Mexico of the proscribed
price advertising," the statute imposed no unconstitutional burden on interstate com-
merce. Id. at 429 (emphasis added). Justice Douglas' language regarding the police
power was simply not directed to the question of extraterritorial regulation.
89 Thus, in Baldwin v. G.A.F Seelig, Inc., the state of New York argued unsuccess-
fully that "[p]rice security.., is only a special form of sanitary security; the economic
motive is secondary and subordinate; the state intervenes to make its inhabitants
healthy, and not to make them rich." 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
90 Compare this view to Edwards v. California, in which the State argued unsuccess-
fully for limits on immigration:
A social problem in the South and Southwest for over half a century, the 'poor
white' tenants and share croppers, following reduction of cotton planting,
droughts and adverse conditions for small-scale farming, swarmed into Cali-
fornia.... They avoid our cities and even our towns by crowding together, in
the open country and in camps, under living conditions shocking both as to
sanitation and social environment. Underfed for many generations, they
bring with them the various nutritional diseases of the South. Their presence
here upon public relief, with their habitual unbalanced diet and consequently
lowered body resistance, means a constant threat of epidemics. Venereal dis-
eases and tuberculosis are common with them, and are on the increase. The
increase of rape and incest are readily traceable to the crowded conditions in
which these people are forced to live. Petty crime among them has featured
the criminal calendars of every community into which they have moved.
314 U.S. 160, 167-68 (1941).
91 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
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New York to prevent what the court characterized as "a milk dealer in
the city of New York" from purchasing low-priced milk in 
Vermont.92
Although Professor Rosen asserts that the citizenship of Seelig is "un-
clear," the Supreme Court record contains Seelig's complaint, which
affirmatively pleads that the plaintiff is both a New York corporation
and a New York "citizen and resident."93 The sources of the lack of
clarity Professor Rosen perceives remain somewhat mysterious. Simi-
larly, in Schwegmann Brothers Giant Super Markets v. Louisiana Milk Com-
mission,94 the Court summarily affirmed an injunction against Louisi-
ana's efforts to preclude a Louisiana partnership from purchasing ice
cream in Tennessee for subsequent sale in Louisiana at less than Lou-
isiana's fixed wholesale price. Most recently, Healy v. Beer Institute in-
validated Connecticut's regulation of beer brewers and distributors on
the ground that it effectively controlled the prices at which those dis-
tributors sold beer in neighboring states.9 The majority noted in pass-
ing that the statute regulated both out-of-state distributors doing
business in Connecticut and "Connecticut brewers who sell both in
Connecticut and in at least one border state," without indicating the
least inclination to uphold the statute with respect to Connecticut
corporations.96 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Seventh Cir-
cuit, in the case that Professor Rosen criticizes, 97 failed to appreciate
what Professor Rosen regards as the crucial significance of state citi-
zenship for Commerce Clause analysis.
There is a final peculiarity in Professor Rosen's view of the Com-
merce Clause. If a state's extraterritorial control of its citizens for
ideological reasons is immunized to Commerce Clause review, the
road to economic Balkanization is paved with good-or at least per-
fectionist-intentions. While Vermont cannot impose a $10-per-
camper tax on camps that serve campers who are residents of Maine,
92 Id. at 518.
93 Transcript of Record at 3, Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935)
(No. 604), microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs (Microcard Editions,
Inc.) (Complaint 1). For what it is worth, the corporation from which the plaintiff
purchased the milk in question was also a New York corporation. Id. (Complaint 8).
94 416 U.S. 922 (1974), summarily affg, 365 F. Supp. 1144, 1152-56 (M.D. La.
1973).
95 491 U.S. 324, 324-25 (1989).
96 Id. at 341; see also United States Brewers Ass'n v. Healy, 692 F.2d 275, 276 (2d
Cir. 1982) (invalidating earlier Connecticut regulation applicable to both local and
foreign importers), affd without opinion, 464 U.S. 909 (1983).
97Dean Foods Co. v. Brancel, 187 F.3d 609, 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding Wis-
consin milk-pricing regulations unconstitutional on extraterritoriality grounds by rea-
soning that the state may not regulate commerce "wholly outside its borders").
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Maine-on the theory that exposure of impressionable children to the
same-sex unions prevalent in Vermont is pernicious-can impose a
$10-per-camper fine on those same campers for use of the same
camps. Although the impact on free trade among the states is identi-
cal, under Professor Rosen's analysis, the latter approach is permissi-
ble. Worse, Vermont would be free to impose reciprocal sanctions on
its own residents for doing business in Maine-a state whose moral
bankruptcy under Vermont's political values is revealed by the anti-
camper tax. And if Vermont were unable to prohibit the sale of low-
cost Maine milk within its boundaries, it would be free to seek Maine
legislation prohibiting residents of Maine from selling milk in Ver-
mont, perhaps in exchange for Vermont legislation barring Vermont
residents from using Maine's waste dumps.
Whether the protections of the Dormant Commerce Clause are
based in the economic benefits of free trade, or a vision of the politi-
cal benefits of a common national market, they can be threatened no
less from the sending than from the receiving end of the interstate
transaction. To prohibit citizens beyond a state's borders from par-
ticipating in commerce is precisely the sort of barrier to internal
commercial union that the Commerce Clause was designed to pre-
vent.
C. Privileges and Immunities and Travel
American liberty entails mobility; our ability to pull up stakes and
move on stands at the core of our self-image, and our geographical in-
terpenetration has forged the United States into a single nation.
Founded by immigrants, expanded by migration, nurtured by move-
ment, rights of mobility have been a staple of American liberty.9 Yet
such rights do not appear in the constitutional text, and one might
have expected that a Court increasingly drawn to textualist analysis of
individual rights would abandon them.
In Saenz v. Roe, decided after my prior articles, six members of the
Court nonetheless reiterated a vision of constitutional structure predi-
cated on free mobility of citizens among states. 99 For individuals, the
Saenz majority proclaimed that "' [i] t is a privilege of citizenship of the
98 I discuss these matters in Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, supra note 2; Kreimer,
Whoever Treasures Freedom, supra note 2, at 914-17; and Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note
2, at 500-08.
99 See 526 U.S. 489, 489-91 (1999) (characterizing discriminatory classifications as
violative of a citizen's right to be treated equally in her new state of residence).
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United States, protected from state abridgement, to enter any State of
the Union, either for temporary sojourn or for the establishment of
permanent residence.' 100 The Court reaffirmed a right to travel "not
found in the text of the Constitution," yet "firmly embedded in our
jurisprudence;" "the right of 'free ingress and regress to and from'
neighboring states" that was expressly mentioned in the text of the Ar-
ticles, of Confederation may simply have been "conceived from the be-
ginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Con-
stitution created."10' According to the Court, travel brings
constitutionally protected opportunities:
[Bly virtue of a person's state citizenship, a citizen of one State who trav-
els in-other States, intending to return home at the end of his journey, is
entitled to enjoy the "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States" that he visits. This provision removes "from the citizens of each
State the disabilities of alienage in the other States."' 2
States, conversely, are bound to accept visitors and migrants by a con-
stitution "'framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several
states must sink or swim together, and that in the long-run prosperity
and salvation are in union and not division."
0 3
Professor Rosen and I disagree on exactly what this vision implies
for efforts by states to interfere with their citizens who seek to take ad-
vantage of legal opportunities provided by other states. In earlier arti-
cles, Professor Rosen acknowledged that states cannot prevent their
citizens from emigrating permanently to a more congenial regime as a
way of escaping moralistic demands.104 I agree; Saenz v. Roe holds
quite squarely that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment embodies a right of each American "'of his own volition [to] be-
come a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide residence
therein,"' and this right binds both state and federal governments.
100 Id. at 511 n.27 (quoting Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 183 (1941) (Jack-
son, J. concurring)).
Id. at 498, 501 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643 (1969);
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966)).
102 Id. at 501-02 (footnote omitted) (quoting Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180
(1869)).
103 Id. at 511 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935)).
104 See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 1, at 1093-106 (arguing that people will move
to localities that match their moral outlook if such localities are well-ordered and that
"exit" rights are necessary to legitimacy of the system); Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authori-
tative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 504 (2000) ("The second requirement is that
those within the perfectionist enclave be able to 'exit' it.").
105 526 U.S. at 503 (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80
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In his current article, Professor Rosen states that "[a] Home State
cannot interfere with its citizens' rights to leave for the purpose of vis-
iting another State nor prevent its citizens from returning.'0 6 Again, I
concur; a line of cases beginning with Crandall v. Nevada' °7 testifies to
this proposition. The question that divides us is what these travelers
may do during their visits.
1. Privileges and Immunities
The first line of analysis begins with a specific constitutional text.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV (also referred to as
the "Comity Clause"), as the Supreme Court reminded us in Saenz v.
Roe, "removes ... 'the disabilities of alienage" from state citizens en-
tering other states in the Union and gives them "'equality of privilege
with citizens of [the host] States."' 08 Under the clause a citizen of one
state is "entitled" while traveling to the "Privileges and Immunities" of
a citizen of the state she visits.'0 9
On its face, this regime implies that where a "host" state provides
its citizens with the "privilege" of engaging in a particular contested
activity, visiting citizens of other states are "entitled" to engage in the
same activity. Thus, in Doe v. Bolton, the Court invalidated Georgia's
attempt to deny women who resided in other states the opportunity to
obtain abortions available to Georgians."0 According to the Court,
"U]ust as the Privileges and Immunities Clause... protects persons
who enter other States to ply their trade ... so must it protect persons
who enter Georgia seeking the medical services that are available
there."''  I have previously argued that this protection also precludes
efforts by travelers' home states to interfere with their efforts to take
advantage of this constitutional entitlement. If Georgia cannot pre-
vent residents of Florida from making use of Georgia's abortion serv-
ices by prosecuting the Georgia doctors who perform the abortions,
Florida cannot make those same services unavailable by prosecuting
the Florida residents for using those services upon their return
home.1
12
(1873)).
,06 Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 913-14.
107 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1868).
108 526 U.S. at 501-02 (quoting Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1869)).
109 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
110 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973).
I Id.
112 This argument shares a structure with the reasoning in Crandall v. Nevada that
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Professor Rosen raises three objections to this reasoning. First, he
notes that as the Supreme Court has interpreted the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, it does not extend to all activities in which a visitor
might wish to engage.1 3 Professor Rosen maintains that "[n]one of
the peripatetic citizens' activities" he considers would fall within the
protection of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.1 4 This objection
is simply not well founded.
While the Court has imposed limits on the scope of the Comity
Clause, Professor Rosen sees the glass as three-quarters empty when in
fact it is ninety-nine percent full. As Professor Rosen points out, the
Supreme Court has held that the opportunity to hunt elk for recrea-
tion can be denied to out-of-state residents because it is not suffi-
ciently "'basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union"' to con-
stitute a privilege or immunity of citizenship."5  But this holding is
unique in recent cases. The Court has found that the opportunity to
practice law, the opportunity to fish for shrimp, the opportunity to
deduct alimony payments from state income taxes, and the opportu-
nity to be employed on public works projects are all "sufficiently basic"
to qualify as "privileges and immunities.""6 Modem cases have reaf-
the citizen's right to petition the national government implies that a state cannot pre-
vent its citizen from leaving for that purpose. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 39-40 (1867).
There have not been many test cases for this proposition, since states have in gen-
eral not attempted to export their morality, but the decision of the New York judiciary
in the midst of the stresses leading up to the Civil War is indicative. Despite the state's
antislavery commitments, an effort to prosecute New York residents who sold a free
black man from New York in Washington, D.C., was held to violate Article IV, Section
2:
The Constitution was intended to be binding, as it regards the rights of the
citizens of the several states, upon the people of the whole union. It was never
intended that a legislature should violate state comity or national rights, as the
section in question does, by assuming to punish as a felony a sale of property
in a state or district where the right exists by the laws of the locality to make
such a sale.
People v. Merrill, 2 Parker's Crim. Cas. 590 (1855); see State v. Cutshall, 15 S.E. 261,
264 (1892) ("The attempt to evade the organic law by making the coming into this
State (after committing an offense in another) a crime is too palpable, in view of the
admitted fact that the Constitution... gives to citizens of all the states the immunities
and privileges of its own citizens .... ).
13 Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 898-899.
"1 Id. at 899.
115 Id. (quoting Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978)).
116 SeeLunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287 (1998) (alimony deduc-
tion); Supreme Court v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1988) (practice of law); Supreme
Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (practice of law); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518
(1978) (employment on public works project); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948)
(fishing for shrimp).
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firmed Justice Bushrod Washington's canonical account of the scope
of the relevant privileges and immunities in Corfield v. Coryell:
They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general
heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty,
with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pur-
sue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such re-
straints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of
the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to re-
side in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional
pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus;
to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to
take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an ex-
emption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other
citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particular privi-
leges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the gen-
eral description of privileges deemed to be fundamental ....
It may be that some peripheral activities fall outside of the protection
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, but in important cases of
moral dissensus, the efforts of host states to impose limits on visitors of
which they relieve their own residents would fall under the clause.'
18
Second, Professor Rosen maintains that the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause imposes limits only on a state's treatment of foreign citi-
zens.1 19 Thus, he takes the position that even if a person with AIDS
117 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230), quoted with approval in
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 385, 387 (1978); see Piper, 470 U.S. at
281 n.10 ("[W]e have noted that those privileges on Justice Washington's list would
still be protected by the [Privileges and Immunities] Clause."); Austin v. New Hamp-
shire, 420 U.S. 656, 661 (1975) (describing Corfield as "the first, and long the leading,
explication of the [Privileges and Immunities] Clause").
Another general account is contained in Paul v. Virginia:
[It is] the object of the clause in question to place the citizens of each State
upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages
resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned. It relieves them
from the disabilities of alienage in other States... it insures to them in other
States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acqui-
sition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness ....
75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868), quoted with approval in Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 523-24
(1978), and Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 380 (1978).
118 I am somewhat mystified at how Professor Rosen can maintain that the oppor-
tunity for minors to obtain an abortion would not be considered a "privilege" or "im-
munity," Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 899, when Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,
200 (1973), cited with approval only last year in Saenz v. Roe, invalidated Georgia's
prohibition of nonresident abortions as a violation of the Comity Clause.
See Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 900 ("The Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause has long been understood as having created limitations on Host States with
respect to citizens visiting from other states, but at no point has it been understood to
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from Utah may be "entitled" under the clause to the "privilege" of us-
ing medical marijuana in California to alleviate his symptoms, Utah
may nonetheless punish him for exercising his constitutional entitle-
ment.
Such a result has no basis in the constitutional text, which seems
to guarantee the "entitlement" of the state citizen against interference
from any quarter; the other provisions of Article IV certainly can be
asserted by a citizen against her state of origin. Allowing a home state
to destroy what a host state is required to give seems an odd way of as-
suring citizens the "same freedom possessed by citizens" of the states
they visit. °
I concede, as I did in my earlier work, that Professor Rosen can
rely on a line of Supreme Court cases with language stating that citi-
zens cannot invoke the protections of the Comity Clause against their
own states. 2' These cases have dealt entirely with actions by states
against their own citizens triggered by the citizens' local actions. They
involve no interaction with other states and thus do not raise the ques-
tion of what status an effort to interfere with an Article IV "entitle-
ment" to engage in out-of-state conduct would have. Still, I must ac-
knowledge that a vindication of a citizen's rights in such a situation
would be required to break some new ground.
122
limit a state's regulatory powers over its own citizens.").
120 Indeed, even if the clause is directed entirely to the dangers of a state's treat-
ment of out-of-state citizens, an interpretation which left a state's treatment of its own
citizens unconstrained would allow states in partnership to manipulate the protections
of the clause out of existence. If New Hampshire sought to eliminate the competition
of Vermont lawyers, it could induce Vermont to prohibit its citizens from practicing
law in New Hampshire-perhaps in exchange for prohibiting New Hampshire resi-
dents from practicing law in Vermont, thereby gutting Piper. So, too, if one took seri-
ously the claim that only out-of-staters could invoke the clause, Vermont could pre-
sumably punish its own citizens for doing business with New Hampshire attorneys it
sought to exclude.
121 There is one Supreme Court case that relies on this proposition for its holding:
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 138 (1872). Professor Rosen's assertion that United
Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984), and Zo-
bel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982), relied on the inapplicability of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 901-02, is mysterious. Zobel
invalidated the statute at issue, 457 U.S. at 65; therefore, the Court could not have re-
lied on the validity of the statute under Article IV. Camden upheld a challenge by an
organization whose members included out-of-state residents against a motion to dis-
miss, 465 U.S. at 223; the outcome could not have been premised on a claim that a
challenge by local residents would fail.
1 A second approach leading to the same conclusion also has no determinative
precedent either way. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment precludes a citizen's home state from "abridging their rights of national
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Finally, Professor Rosen invokes the proposition that the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, as currently interpreted, is not "absolute"1
23
and maintains that the effort to prevent citizens from avoiding the le-
gal regime of their home state should be viewed as a sufficient basis
for either the home state or the host state to prevent conduct in which
the traveler would otherwise be entitled to engage under the Comity
Clause.
124
Here, again, we function largely without direct precedent. Profes-
sor Rosen acknowledges that in Austin v. New Hampshire, the Supreme
Court stated that "the constitutionality of one State's statutes affecting
nonresidents [cannot] depend upon the present configuration of the
statutes of another State.' 25  Austin quoted Travis v. Yale & Towne
Manufacturing Co. to emphasize that the entitlements under the Com-
ity Clause accrue to citizens, rather than the states where they reside:
"'A State may not barter away the right, conferred upon its citizens by
the Constitution of the United States, to enjoy the privileges and im-
munities of citizens when they go into other States."""' Professor
Rosen maintains that these cases are distinguishable because they in-
volve "self-interested," "beggar-thy-neighbor" statutes rather than ef-
citizenship." Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503 n.15 (1999). Since the "entitlement" to
engage in contested activities on a basis of equality with foreign citizens in a foreign
state arises from the national Constitution, it is a right of national citizenship. There-
fore, regardless of whether this right can be asserted directly against the home state
under Article IV, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
precludes the home state from seeking to interfere with a citizen who takes advantage
of this right.
Colgate v. Harey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), adopted a similar theory in striking down a
discriminatory state tax applied to a citizen's out-of-state bank deposits under the Four-
teenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause, as an interference with rights
of national citizenship. Id. at 433. Colgate was overruled in Madden v. Kentucky on the
ground that "[a]n interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause which re-
stricts the power of the states to manage their own fiscal affairs is a matter of gravest
concern." 309 U.S. 83, 93 (1940). The approach I suggest, by contrast, imports no
untoward interventions on state fiscal policy. Indeed, the tax at issue in Madden would
now be impermissible as a burden on interstate commerce, see, e.g., Fulton Corp. v.
Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 346 (1996) (finding North Carolina's intangibles tax violated
the Commerce Clause where it was facially discriminatory against interstate com-
merce), and probably violates the Equal Protection Clause as well. See Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 883 (1985) (finding Alabama's domestic preference tax vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause where it promoted domestic businesses by discrimi-
natin against nonresident competitors).
Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 907.
124 Id. at 907-08.
125 420 U.S. 656, 668 (1975).
126 Id. at 667 (quoting Travis v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co., 252 U.S. 60, 82
(1920)).
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forts to give deference to the goals of neighboring states. From the
point of view of whether the discrimination produces friction between
the states, this may be relevant; when both states agree that a traveler
should be unable to exercise the privileges of local citizens, no official
interstate friction will result. But the Comity Clause was designed to
give the people of the United States the benefits of national unity
128
even if particular sets of states would prefer mutual insularity. From
the point of view of the ability of traveling citizens to participate
equally in the life of the states they visit, whether laws which label
them as visiting aliens result from protectionism or reciprocally paro-
chial motivations is irrelevant. The impact of separating Americans
from one another by state of origin is identical, and it is the rights of
the citizens that the state may not "barter away."
On the other hand, in no case that either Professor Rosen or I can
identify has a court dismissed a privileges and immunities claim on
the ground that the discrimination in question is necessary to prevent
a citizen from avoiding the extraterritorial strictures that her home
state imposes on her conduct. Professor Rosen adverts to Bradford
Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, in which New Hampshire, in the course
of a suit between a Vermont employee and a Vermont employer, ap-
plied a Vermont statute precluding recovery for an accident in New
Hampshire.' The Clapper Court's holding, however, was not based
127 Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 906.
128 As Gerald Neuman explains:
Both the wording of the clause and its interpretation suggest as a paradigm
the right of a citizen of state A, while physically within the borders of state B,
to interact with citizens of state B on the same legal terms as those that govern
their interaction among themselves....
Nonresidents who are known to carry their domicile's law with them can-
not participate as equals in the life of the state.
Gerald L. Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-Determination, 135
U. PA. L. REV. 261, 323-24 (1987) (footnotes omitted); see also Douglas Laycock, Equal
Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 249, 263-70 (1992) ("The Clause is first and foremost a national unity
provision ..... with ... the.., dual purpose of achieving national unity and preserving
the states as separate polities."); Douglas Laycock, Equality and the Citizens of Sister States,
15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 431, 438-39 (1987) ("The -Constitution we have preserves the
states as separate polities, but also federates them into the larger polity of the union.");
Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487,
518-19 (1981) ("The framers adopted the constitutional ban on state discrimination
against non-residents primarily as an instrument of national unification. The nondis-
crimination principles... leave[] people free to make their home in one state without
sacrificing the opportunity to share in the bounty found in others.").
129 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
130 Id. at 157.
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on the duties of citizenship or a right to control citizens extraterritori-
ally. The Supreme Court relied on the conduct of the parties within
Vermont itself: entry into the underlying employment contract, which
excluded recovery. The opinion disavowed any implication that Ver-
mont could control the actions of its citizens extraterritorially. It em-
phasized:
[Vermont's] statute does not undertake to prohibit acts beyond the bor-
ders of the State. Compare Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578; Nutting v.
Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 553, 557. It does not attempt to forbid or regu-
late subsequent modification of the Vermont contract, or the formation
of subsidiary contracts, or new agreements, by the parties in other States.
Compare New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149; New York Lfe Ins.
Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357. It affects only the rights and liabilities of par-
ties who by their conduct within the State have subjected themselves to
its operation. As to those parties, its effect is not to create a liability for
acts without the State, compare Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 234
U.S. 542, but to give rise to a defense in consequence of acts within.
13'
The "interest" of the home state in extraterritorial moralism is in
excluding the experiences buried in their citizens' memories when
they return to their residence. It is far from clear that this interest is
one that is "substantial."
2. The Right to Travel and Its Reasons
If we focus on constitutional structure, the result is similar. The
Court in Saenz reaffirmed the proposition that "'the nature of our
131 Id. at 157 n.7. Professor Rosen's reliance on Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975),
is equally tenuous. He focuses on one of three grounds that together the opinion
characterizes as a "reasonable" justification for the statute in question. See Rosen, Ex-
traterritoriality, supra note 1, at 908-09 (discussing Sosna in the context of "a Host State's
desire not to interfere in the policy of a sister state"); see also Sosna, 419 U.S. at 406-07
(finding Iowa durational residency requirement for divorce reasonably justified on
grounds of the state's interests in (1) requiring those seeking a divorce to have a
"modicum of attachment to the State," (2) insulating its divorce decrees from collat-
eral attack, and (3) not becoming "a divorce mill for unhappy spouses"). As he ac-
knowledges, this alone raises questions about whether deference to a home state's pol-
icy alone would constitute a "substantial" justification required by Comity Clause
analysis. Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 908-09. More importantly, the Sosna
Court's acknowledgement of a desire to avoid "officious intermeddling in matters in
which another State has a paramount interest," 419 U.S. at 407, arises out of the fact
that a divorce decree has direct impact on the legal rights not only of the person seek-
ing the decree, but of that person's spouse, who may be a resident of another state. An
interest in avoiding legal disruption of family relations in other states or avoiding de-
struction of legal relations established by other states is quite different from an interest
in allowing another state to spare its citizens the discomfort of knowing that one of
their compatriots violated their moral code extraterritorially.
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Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty
unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the
length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules or regu-
lations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.
'" 3 2
This freedom to "travel throughout the length and breadth of our
land" is not important because it allows citizens to observe new land-
scapes, but because the right to travel contributes to our constitu-
tional structure by providing the opportunity for interaction among
fellow Americans. It is by intercourse as equals that the country is knit
together across parochial boundaries, and it is by sharing the experi-
ence of others that our personal horizons are broadened and our lib-
erty reaffirmed. If our bodies can move among states, but our free-
dom of action is tied to our place of origin, then the "right to travel"
becomes a hollow shell.
Under Professor Rosen's scheme, the right to travel is vulnerable
to exactly this evisceration. Imagine that New York comes under the
sway of a majority of radical vegetarians. Not content with punishing
the consumption of meat and cognizant of the importance of norms
and social pressure in shaping behavior, the state legislature adopts a
code which bars "giving aid and comfort to carnivores," prohibiting
any citizen of the state from doing business with, providing anything
of value to, associating socially with, or approaching closer than ten
feet to any person who consumes meat. If Bill Clinton decides to
travel to Texas, he can do so under Professor Rosen's approach. But
when Clinton arrives in Texas, not only will he be liable to punish-
ment in New York if he eats a locally legal Big Mac, but he also will be
barred from any effective interaction with the people or society
around him. He might as well stay in Chappaqua. As Professor Tribe
put the point:
The conclusion that a state's legal system must not hobble a citizen as
she travels from state to state follows from a conception of interstate
mobility that entails something more than just a change of scenery. If
each state could decide for itself, possibly with some measure of congres-
132 526 U.S. 489, 499 (1999) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629
(1969)).
133 Professor Rosen acknowledges that "shunning" is a standard method of control
among perfectionist communities. Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 1, at 1144. The
prohibitions on business dealings and transfers of funds are economic regulations sub-
ject only to rational basis scrutiny. With regard to the prohibition of social association,
compare City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23-25 (1989), with City of Chicago v. Mora-
les, 527 U.S. 41, 52-55 (1999). On the prohibition on approaching others, see Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
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sional authorization, how much of its legal system its citizens would have
to carry around on their backs while seeking to take advantage of the le-
gal environments of other states, then the right to choose which state to
enter for any purpose lawful in that state would amount to nothing more
than the right to have the physical environment of the states of one's
choosing pass before one's eyes in a kind of virtual reality arcade while
one remained strapped at all times in a legally fixed and closed envi-
ronment. Surely, however, more than that is involved in the right of in-
terstate mobility that follows from the basic structure of our federal Un-
ion.3 4
To be sure, not every perfectionist state will isolate its citizens so fully,
but it is the true believers who will be tempted most by Professor
Rosen's invitation.
Professor Rosen would doubtless respond to this analysis, as he
does in the body of his article, with the accusation that it is grounded
in my "bald" assertions, 3' and it is true that no case explicitly prohibits
the type of state action that Professor Rosen invites. This is not be-
cause the courts approve of such action, but rather because it does not
occur. Although they are willing to protect their local interests against
concrete threats, American states acknowledge the sovereignty of their
fellow members of the Union within their respective borders, and
have not engaged in the extraterritorial projection of perfectionist
morality. In my view, this practice appropriately reflects the nature of
our constitutional culture.
III. PERSPECTIVES FROM PHILOSOPHY
A. Reading Rawls
In an innovative approach, Professor Rosen maintains that a
"Rawlsian" analysis mandates that states be able to enforce their per-
fectionist norms against extraterritorial conduct by their citizens. 36 I
134 Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival
Portend the Future-Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARv. L. REV. 110, 152
(1999).
135 See Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 913 ("The nature of our national
identity is deeply contested, and bald appeals to 'national identity' of the sort made by
Professor Kreimer cannot decide the question at issue."); id. at 913 n.240 ("[Professor
Kreimer] ... baldly asserts that the clause 'imparts to individual American citizens the
freedom that accompanies national citizenship."' (quoting Kreimer, Whoever Treasures
Freedom, supra note 2, at 920)). This is a particularly difficult criticism for me as middle
age advances and my hairline recedes.
136 See Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 888 ("From a Rawlsian perspective,
a federal system in which states may extraterritorially regulate their traveling citizens is
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must confess the argument seems to me less than overwhelming.
Initially, one might question why in construing the mandates of
American federalism, we should rely on a Harvard philosopher of the
late twentieth century. Locke or Hume might be relevant to original
understandings, but I have been unable to identify a single citation to
Professor Rawls in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence or the relevant
constitutional documents. There is, moreover, some peculiarity in the
effort to invoke Rawls as a basis for a paternalist/perfectionist claim of
the sort that Professor Rosen seeks to advance. As Professor Rosen
acknowledges in an earlier article, "Rawls expressly states that he be-
lieves that political perfectionists cannot be accommodated under po-
litical liberalism.0 37 Professor Rosen seeks to maintain, however, that
the nature of American federalism makes a liberal duty what Rawls
denies is a liberal option.
It seems to me that in a number of areas Professor Rosen misap-
plies Rawls' philosophical apparatus. But Professor Rosen need not
the fair and just political structure.").
137 Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 1, at 1106. Rawls flatly rejects the possibility of
perfectionist claims as the basis of public decisions, at least where they interfere with
the liberties of individuals. JOHN RAWLS, THEORY OFJUSTICE 327-30 (1971) [hereinaf-
ter RAWLS, THEORY OFJUSTICE].
138 For example, Professor Rosen seeks to assimilate the capacity to regulate moral-
istically to the "basic liberty of conscience" to which Rawls accords lexical priority in a
fairly just state. It is not entirely clear that the right to regulate others is, in Rawls'
view, a "liberty," a term that is generally identified with the opportunity to accomplish
one's own ends, not the opportunity to impose one's ends on others. In Outer Limits,
supra note 1, Professor Rosen argues that the right to regulate is a "pre-condition" for a
perfectionist life, but this is a misuse of the Rawlsian scheme; Rawls clearly limits the
right to the preconditions necessary for a liberty to "equal value" of political rights. See
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 356-58 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM] (allowing for regulation of political speech only where it is "rationally de-
signed to achieve the fair value of the political liberties"). Perhaps Professor Rosen
believes that the right to control others' actions is a part of the "political liberty" of self-
governance to which Rawls does in fact allude.
But if the right to regulate behavior Z can be a matter of conscience and basic lib-
erty, then presumably the right (or obligation) to engage in behavior Z can equally be
a matter of conscience and basic liberty. What we have then, in Rawlsian terms, is a
conflict between two "basic liberties." One way of limiting such conflicts, for Rawls, is
the stipulation it is only over its "central range" that each liberty must be "fully ade-
quate." See id. at 295-97 ("[B]asic liberties can be made compatible with one another,
at least in their central range of application."); JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, A
RESTATEMENT §§ 32.1-32.2 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) [hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS] ("So long as what we may call 'the central range of application' of each basic
liberty is secured, the two principles are fulfilled."). Professor Rosen does not seek to
identify the "central range" of the "liberties" he is seeking to protect.
As we have seen, the norm in American society is a conception of domestic regula-
tory power; in general, citizens who seek to drive over the speed limit, to gamble, or to
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make a technical philosophical argument. His position is "Rawlsian"
primarily to the extent that he utilizes Rawls' heuristic device of the
original position. The core of his argument, as I understand it, is an
intuitive claim that because territorial limitations preclude the full
achievement of a class of political ideals in which some people may be-
lieve deeply, such a structure would not be chosen behind a veil of ig-
norance by individuals who do not know whether they themselves
might be adherents of such ideals, and is, therefore, unfair.
The first premise of Professor Rosen's argument has some merit.
Some citizens cannot fully achieve their conscientious goals without
exerting state authority to assure that all members of their locality
abide by those goals. If states are territorially limited and residents
can temporarily escape moralistic regulation by traveling to more lib-
ertarian states, then those who desire as a matter of conscience to live
in a society in which everyone else always acts in accordance with their
chosen norm (let us call it "Z') can accomplish the goal fully only if
they can persuade all of the others in the society to live in that fash-
ion. Even if I can ban all local "adult entertainment," my burning
moral desire that no member of my community be polluted by por-
nography will fail if my fellows still can read dirty books across the
border. Territorial limitations mean that true believers can achieve 7,
compliance with respect to actions within the state, but lose the possi-
bility of coercing their fellows extraterritorially. They risk having to
live in proximity to those who act differently outside of the state and
therefore will find it harder to pursue their ideals.
39
But Professor Rosen's deduction from this proposition neglects
another set of considerations that would be relevant behind a Rawl-
sian veil of ignorance. In addition to Z-opponents, a society may con-
read locally obscene material all have the capacity to avoid domestic regulations by ex-
traterritorial excursions. As a matter of observation, these limitations have not under-
cut the core of self-government. Since Rawls looks to political culture to identify the
"central range" of basic liberties (including, presumably, the liberty of self-
governance), RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra, at 346, it would seem that the "cen-
tral range" of moralistic self-governance in American society is generally territorial.
Indeed, for Rawls, the liberty of self-government in general appears to be territorial.
SeeJOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 38-39 (1999) ("[A]n important role of a peo-
ple's government.., is to be the representative and effective agent of a people as they
take responsibility for their territory.").
139 Note that the position for which Professor Rosen contends here is not simply,
as he articulated the matter in Outer Limits, that "political perfectionists who satisfy spe-
cific criteria to govern themselves" and to "associate as they believe necessary for their
self-development," Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 1, at 1061, 1091, but rather that po-
litical perfectionists should have the right to take control of the machinery of an entire
state and to impose their chosen morality on all of its residents extraterritorially.
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tain Zenthusiasts, and in the original position one cannot know which
group will predominate. If Z-enthusiasts prove to be the majority, they
would be in a position to mandate the practice of Z140 Thus, a 7,
opponent in the original position choosing between my position of
territorialism (or "soft pluralism") and Professor Rosen's position of
extraterritorialism (or "hard pluralism") confronts the following deci-
sion structure:
1) Under territorialism, either Z-opponents or Z-enthusiasts can escape
temporarily to the sanctuary of other states leaving open possible
outcomes:
la) A ban on Z-practice with the possibility of escape for Z-
enthusiasts; or
lb) A mandate of Z-practice with the possibility of escape for 7
opponents.
2) Under extraterritorialism, neither 7-opponents nor Z-enthusiasts can
escape, leaving open possible outcomes:
2a) A ban on Z-practice with no possibility of escape for Z-
enthusiasts, short of emigration; or
2b) A mandate of Zpractice with no possibility of escape for Z-oppo-
nents, short of emigration.
A Z-opponent would presumably rank the results: 2a>la>2b>lb.
The possibility of inescapably imposing a Z ban would be the best out-
come; the possibility of inescapably suffering a Z mandate would be
the worst. If Rawls is correct in his argument that under conditions of
radical uncertainty the parties would adopt a maximin strategy,
14 ' even
if one knew that one was a Zopponent, one would opt for territorial-
ism behind the veil. The outcome a Z-opponent would most want to
avoid is the possibility of being forced to 
engage in Z herself.
14
1
140 In many cases, as for example in the case of abortion, Zenthusiasts will be con-
tent to allow, rather than mandate, the contested practice, but there will be other
situations, like the choice between open and closed adoptions, where enthusiasts will
impose their choices on their fellows.
141 RAWLs, JUSTICE As FAIRNESS, supra note 138, §§ 28.1-28.2; RAwLS, THEORY OF
JUSTICE, supra note 137, at 152-54.
142 1 must admit that a properly creative political theorist could generate a set of
conscientious preferences in which evils of the possibility of Z-practice by others extra-
territorially dominates the possibility of being required to engage in Z oneself. See, e.g.,
Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal,'78 J. POL. ECON. 152, 155 (1970)
("Person 1, who is prude, prefers most that no one reads [Lady Chatterly's Lover] but
given the choice between [himself or another] reading it, he would prefer that he read
it himself rather than exposing gullible Mr. 2 to the influences of Lawrence."). Prude,
believing himself immune to the evils of pornography, would be indifferent between
outcomes 2b (where both Prude and Lewd could be required to read pornography in
their home state) and lb (same situation, but Prude can temporarily escape to Utah).
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Equally important, in the original position, one must contend
with the possibility that one will end up being a Zenthusiast. If states
can impose their moralisms extraterritorially, then those who consci-
entiously pursue norm Z but would like to live in the state because it
has characteristics A through Y (hearth, home, job, and friends), will
be forced to sacrifice either A through Yor Z.
Behind the Rawlsian veil, just as I cannot know whether I am a lib-
eral or a perfectionist, I cannot know whether I will represent a per-
son whose system of meaning forbids or requires a particular con-
tested practice. The appropriate Rawlsian question is whether I would
be more willing to risk living in a polity where my ideals are incom-
pletely realized-because some can evade them--or a polity in which
my ideals are entirely suppressed and can be realized only by leaving
my home, my job, and my friends entirely. I would submit that a deci-
sion-making procedure that seeks to avoid the worst outcome would
seek to avoid the second risk.
Indeed, this seems to be the burden of the text upon which Pro-
fessor Rosen relies. He quotes Rawls for the proposition that since the
parties "'do not know whether the beliefs espoused by the persons
they represent [are] a majority or a minority view,"' they cannot "'take
chances by permitting a lesser liberty of conscience to minority relig-
But he would prefer an outcome that could forbid Lewd to read porn in Babylon, NY
(2a) to one in which Lewd could escape (la).
Similarly, since September 11 hijacker Mohammed Atta preferred death and the
possibility of the triumph of his preferred norms to life and the existence of a society
whose commitments he found repulsive, one might infer that he would be equally re-
pelled by the existence of such a society within which he was free to pursue his own
goals and one in which he was himself forced to participate in the activities he found
conscientiously distasteful. After all, he could always escape the imposition by suicide.
But these examples have the smell of the lamp about them; they are neither plau-
sible guides for public policy nor likely in a country with America's constitutional
commitments to constitute the moral bases on which lives are constructed.
As Ned Diver pointed out to me in comments on this paper:
[In Rawlsian terms] these cases are exceptions to the general rule that the
ability to pursue one's own conception of the good is more important than
being able to enforce that view on others. Since these examples are excep-
tions, they don't have a real effect on the rationality of the decision behind
the veil of ignorance.... [T]he idea that people should, in general, be free to
pursue their own conceptions of the good . . . requires that limitations be
placed on interference with others' [pursuing] their conceptions of the good.
The creative exceptions don't change the fact that this is the best general bet
from the original position ....
E-mail from Edward Diver, Doctoral Candidate, Department of Philosophy, University
of Pennsylvania, to Seth F. Kreimer, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law
School (Nov. 7, 2001, 11:00:12 EST) (on file with author).
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ions, say, on the possibility that those they represent espouse a major-
ity or dominant religion and will therefore have an even greater lib-
erty. - 41 If this is true for conscientious beliefs about religion, it would
seem to be equally true for conscientious beliefs about abortion,
medical marijuana, or assisted suicide.
It will not do to say that the right to impose moralisms that Profes-
sor Rosen espouses is limited to areas which are not themselves rec-
ognized as constitutionally protected. Behind the Rawlsian veil, one
cannot be assured that in cases of conflict, one's own conscientious
commitments will be recognized by the courts. A structure that pre-
serves the opportunity to pursue conscientious commitments where
they are recognized by any state in the union would seem to be the
structure that avoids "taking chances with liberty.",
44
B. "Evasion" and Moral Obligation
Professor Rosen's denigration of the process of taking advantage
of neighboring liberties as "travel-evasion" seems to be rooted in a
sense that there is something disreputable or immoral about the en-
terprise. In Professor Rosen's view, residents owe their states obedi-
ence no matter where their actions occur and the effort to take advan-
tage of other legal regimes is an improper evasion of this obligation.1
45
But if the opportunities provided by a federal structure are legitimate,
taking advantage of them is no more an "evasion" of legitimate obliga-
tions than claiming a legitimate child-care deduction is an "evasion" of
the income tax. Thus, in evaluating Professor Rosen's criticism, one
must reflect on exactly how far a moral duty of obedience to law ex-
tends and in doing so, it is worth engaging in a somewhat wider scope
of philosophical exploration than does Professor Rosen.
One possible ground of obligation is consent. Certainly, John
Locke argued that:
143 Rosen, Extraterritariality, supra note 1, at 888 (alteration in original) (quoting
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 138, at 26).
144 A final thought: for Rawls himself, at least in his later work, a key goal of the
system is the establishment of "social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect,"
RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 138, at 337-38, an ideal that would seem to
be better furthered by forcing moralistic majorities to rely on persuasion for the full
accomplishment of their ideals.
145 Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 883 ("Since consent to abide by laws
that are lawfully enacted, and to incur the consequences if one does not, is a corner-
stone of citizenship, it is fair for a state to expect that its citizens will obey legitimately
enacted state laws .... ).
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[E]very man that hath any possessions or enjoyment of any part of the
dominions of any government doth thereby give his tacit consent and is
as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during
such enjoyment, as anyone under it; whether this his possession be of
land to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week, or
whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway; and, in effect, it
reaches as far as the very being of anyone within the territories of that
146government.
But tacit consent seems a weak basis on which to found a moral obli-
gation to forsake our core interests. A young woman born into a
household in Pennsylvania has not chosen to subject herself to a pa-
rental consent requirement for abortions, a comatose man in Wiscon-
sin does not choose to abandon the opportunity to die with dignity,
and few would say that an AIDS patient in Utah forced to choose be-
tween the only available means of avoiding suffering and abandon-
ment of his family and friends acts immorally in seeking to avoid the
choice. These are not the sort of free decisions that usually support
the voluntary assumption of obligation. As Hume put the matter, "We
may as well assert that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents
to the dominion of the master, though he was carried on board while
asleep, and must leap into the ocean and perish the moment he leaves
her."147 Indeed, the prospect of temporary sanctuary in other states
146 JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Civil Government, in TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 119,182 (Thomas I. Cook ed., Hafner Publ'g Co. 1947) (1690).
147 DAVID HUME, Of the Original Contract [hereinafter HUME, Original Contract], in
HUME'S MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 356, 363 (Henry Aiken ed., Hafner Publ'g
Co. 1948) (1748). Later versions of this objection exist in the literature. See, e.g.,
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 192-93 ("Consent cannot be binding on people...
unless it is given more freely and with more genuine alternate choice than just by de-
clining to build a life from nothing under a foreign flag."); RUTH W. GRANT, JOHN
LOCKE's LIBERALISM 126 (1987) ("If the criteria [for what constitutes consent] are
'weak,' for example, mere residence in one's native country, then consent theory...
blunts the point of the claim that no man is subject to the authority of another without
his own consent."); KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 73 (1987)
("People stay in homelands because of language, culture,job, friends, and family; their
inertia hardly indicates approval or acceptance of government and laws."); DON
HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES 183 (1989) ("Skeptical objections come fast and furious, only
some of them with a nod to Hume.... Maybe [residence] signifies apathy; maybe it
signifies lack of alternatives.... Subjection to the government... might be something
I'm grudgingly willing to put up with as the onerous price tag attached to staying.");
DON HERZOG, WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS 80 (1985) ("One can take as consent only
those acts that allow.., a way of refusing consent. Therefore, if our very being within
territories of the government is to count as consent, we must be allowed to leave.");
GEORGE KLOsKO, THE PRINCIPLE OF FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION 143 (1992)
("If consent is reduced to residence, or even to one's mere presence in the country,
then voluntary consent has lost its point."); JOSEPH RAz, MORALITY OF FREEDOM 88-94
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provided by territorial limits may constitute the only situation in which
one could plausibly claim that the citizen has made a choice to bind
herself to the law of her home state. It is precisely this prospect that
Professor Rosen denies.
As I have previously argued, the most plausible claims for an obli-
gation of legal obedience are based either on the Humean argument
that the obligation of obedience is a crucial element of a civilized or-
der that protects against descent into violence and mutual oppression
or on the belief that moral authority of the law arises out of the obli-
gation to fairly support reasonably just institutions of which one reaps
the benefit. 48 Yet neither of the arguments justifies extraterritorial
obligations.
Hume's claim rests on the proposition:
[M]en could not live at all in a society... without laws and magistrates
and judges to prevent the encroachments of the strong upon the weak,
of the violent upon the just and equitable .... If the reason be asked of
that obedience which we are bound to pay to government, I readily an-
swer, because society could not 
otherwise subsist.
14
(1986) ("[T]he instrumental as well as non-instrumental validations of consent depend
on its being freely given."); A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL
OBLIGATIONS (1979) ("The problem is that it is precisely the most valuable "posses-
sions" a man has that are often tied necessarily to his country of residence and cannot
be taken from it.").
148 This is the source of obligation for John Rawls, of whom Professor Rosen is
otherwise enamored. SeeRAwLS, THEORY OFJUSTICE, supra note 137, at 111-12 ("[The
principle of fairness] holds that a person is required to do his part as defined by the
rules of an institution when ... the institution is just... and... one has voluntarily
accepted the benefit of the arrangement.... All obligations arise in this way.").
49 HUME, Original Contract, supra note 147, at 368. See generally id. at 359-72 (dis-
cussing practical necessity as justification for government authority); DAVID HUME,
Treatise of Human Nature [hereinafter HUME, Human Nature], in HUME'S MORAL AND
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 147, at 2, 114 ("When men have once experienced
the impossibility of preserving any steady order in society while every one is his own
master... they naturally run into the invention of government .... [The natural sup-
position of obedience] of right and obligation are derived from nothing but the advan-
tage we reap from government."); id. at 104 ("We shall quickly see how fruitless it is
to... seek in the laws of nature a stronger foundation for our political duties than in-
terest and human conventions."); id. at 105 ("To obey the civil magistrate is requisite
to preserve order and concord in society.").
The problem, as Hume conceived it, was what we would today call a prisoner's di-
lemma.:
[Men] prefer any trivial advantage that is present to the maintenance of order
in society which so much depends on the observance of justice. The conse-
quences of every breach of equity seem to lie very remote, and are not liable
to counterbalance any immediate advantage that may be reaped from it....
[A]s all men are in some degree subject to the same weakness, it necessarily
2002],
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But when a citizen travels into the realm of another sovereign, obedi-
ence to the host's laws is perfectly adequate to assure "that society can
subsist. " '5 Likewise, the obligation to "support" just institutions does
not carry any necessary implications as to the geographical scope of
the duty. It is entirely consistent with the proposition that, as long as I
do not actively seek to undermine the just institutions of my home
state-as by committing treason or shooting a cannon into its territory
or discharging noxious fumes across the border-my obligation to
"support" my home institution is liquidated by my obedience to its
laws within its boundaries, and my payment of taxes while I reside
there. And assuming that we treat both home state and host state as
'Just institutions," when a Utah citizen travels to California, under this
theory she is under a duty to "support" California, as well as Utah.
When the laws of California soberly inform her that the opportunity
to choose her reproductive future is her moral and legal right, she
owes deference to its 'Just judgments" as well as those of her home
state.
The crucial point of these analyses is that a citizen who takes ad-
vantage of the liberties of neighboring states does not evade an obliga-
tion to obey the law. Rather the obligation to obey the home state's
law simply does not reach into the territory of the sister state; on her
territory, there is an obligation to obey her law. Such an approach
does not substitute anarchy or raw will for the rule of law, for it is only
liberties that are sufficiently well grounded to command the respect of
happens that the violations of equity must become very frequent in society,
and the commerce of men by that means be rendered very dangerous and
uncertain.... Your example both pushes me forward in this way by imitation,
and also affords me a new reason for any breach of equity by showing me that
I should be the cully of my integrity if I alone should impose upon myself a se-
vere restraint amidst the licentiousness of others.
HUME, Human Nature, supra, at 98.
The Humean consequentialist argument is approvingly rehearsed in HERZOG,
WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS, supra note 147, at 180-87, sketching Hume's account of po-
litical obligation and defending it against a line of criticism. Cf KLOSKO, supra note
147, at 93-94 (presenting problems with Hume's assessments of the benefits ofjustice).
150 Cf THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 153-54 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1991) (1651) ("The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last
as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them....
For whosoever entereth into anothers dominion, is subject to all the laws thereof, un-
less he have a privilege by the amity of the sovereigns."). It is true that extraterritorial
actions may undermine particular policies, but in the absence of some concrete effects
on the home state, they do not threaten a slide into anarchy. Indeed the fact that the
United States has functioned with reasonable stability during its first 175 years under a
regime that held extraterritorial moralism unambiguously unconstitutional suggests
that extraterritorial moralism cannot be the sine qua non of effective polity.
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another state of the union that may be claimed in this fashion. Where
the moral judgment of two sovereigns clashes, federalism leaves the
citizen some opportunity to take advantage of the judgment of either.
CONCLUSION
Professor Rosen may, of course, reply to my philosophical excur-
sus that Hume is no more determinative of constitutional analysis
than is Rawls. If so, we must return to the text, history, structure, and
practice of American federalism. All of these, it still seems to me,
weigh heavily against the extraterritorial assertion of moralism to pun-
ish actions that take place on the soil of and with the permission of sis-
ter states. State boundaries are not mere lines on a map; they are
lines in the sand. In our federal system, by stepping over those lines
an American citizen may claim her freedom.
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APPENDIX: STATE CONSTITUTIONAL BARS TO
EXTRATERRITORIAL PROSECUTION
Thirty-three states have constitutional provisions that require ju-
ries in criminal trials to be drawn from the geographical district in
which the crime occurred:
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
Colorado
Florida
Hawaii
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Mexico
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Utah
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Art. I, § 6
Art. II, § 24
Art. II, § 10
Art. II, § 16
Art. I, § 16(a)
Art. I, § 14
Art. I, § 8
Art. I, § 13
Bill of Rights, § 10
Bill of Rights, § 11
Art. I, § 16
Art. I, § 6
Art. XIII, pt. 1
Art. I, § 6
Art. III, § 26
Art. 1, § 18(a)
Art. II, § 24
Art. I, § 11
Art. XVII, pt. 1
Art. II, § 14
Art. I, § 10
Art. II, § 20
Art. I, § 11
Art. I, § 9
Art. I, § 11
Art. VI, § 7
Art. I, § 9
Art. I, § 12
Art. I, § 8
Art. I, § 22
Art. III, § 14
Art. I, § 7
Art. I, § 10
Courts in these states have found territorial constraints in other provi-
sions of their constitution as well.'
I E.g., State v. Smith, 421 N.W.2d 315 (Minn. 1988) ("[A]n attempt to exercise to-
tally extraterritorial jurisdiction is contravened both by state and federal constitutional
principles. Only if some part of the crime was committed within the State of Minne-
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In Maryland, whose Declaration of Rights provides "[t]hat the trial
of the facts, where they arise is one of the greatest securities of the
lives, liberties and estate of the People,"2 the courts take the position
that "'an offense against the laws of the State of Maryland is punish-
able only when committed within its territory. A person cannot be
convicted here for crimes committed in another state.'""
In addition, I have been able to identify four other states-Idaho,
Michigan, New York, and North Carolina-whose highest courts have
interpreted their own constitutional conceptions of state sovereignty
to preclude wholly extraterritorial prosecutions during the last quar-
ter of the twentieth century.' There may well be others that have es-
caped my research.
sota does the state have jurisdiction to punish the crime."); State v. Baldwin, 305 A.2d
555 (Me. 1973) ("'It is elementary law that the statutes of a state have no ex-
tra-territorial force, nor do its courts have any jurisdiction of offenses committed in
other states or foreign countries.' (quoting State v. Stephens, 107 A. 296, 297 (Me.
1919))).
2 MD. CONST. art. 20.
3 Maryland v. Butler, 724 A.2d 657, 660 (Md. 1999) (quoting Bowen v. State, 111
A.2d 844, 847 (Md. 1955)).
4 See State v. Cochran, 538 P.2d 791, 793 (Idaho 1975) (holding that, as a general
rule, Idaho courts lack jurisdiction over criminal offenses that were not committed in
the state); People v. Blume, 505 N.W.2d 843,845 (Mich. 1993) (determining that
Michigan courts do not exercise jurisdiction over crimes that occur out of state unless
the act was intended to have, and actually does have, a detrimental effect within the
state); People v. McLaughlin, 606 N.E.2d 1357, 1359 (N.Y. 1992) ('jurisdiction ... is a
question of the sovereign's power to prosecute and punish an accused for conduct
which is allegedly criminal. Because the State only has power to enact and enforce
criminal laws within its territorial borders, there can be no criminal offense unless it
has territorial jurisdiction." (citation omitted)); State v. Batdorf, 238 S.E.2d 497, 502
(N.C. 1977) ("We have recognized from earliest times that the criminal jurisdiction of
our courts is territorially restricted."); cf State v. Wagner, 596 N.W.2d 83, 88-89 (Iowa
1999) (holding that jurisdictional provisions of Iowa's criminal code preclude wholly
extraterritorial prosecution).
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